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Abstract
This thesis is a collection of three empirical essays on firms, banks, and access to finance.
Chapter 1 provides evidence that credit subsidies for exports are substantially misallocated
towards financially unconstrained firms. Using loan level data for firms and exploiting an
exogenous change in loan eligibility, I show that publicly listed firms are financially
unconstrained, and are also allocated nearly 44% of all subsidized loans. The opportunity cost of
these misallocated funds is significant as even the more productive privately held firms are
shown to be financially constrained.
Chapter 2 studies the role of banks in the transmission of financial flows to the economy.
Exploiting a large and unexpected liquidity upsurge in an emerging economy, the chapter
examines changes in bank lending behavior and finds very stark results. Bank lending to firms
did not increase despite a substantial drop in the cost of capital. The results suggest that banks
may be limited in their ability to extend credit due to severe agency problems.
Chapter 3 analyzes changes in firm ownership structure that may be caused by the level and
ease of obtaining outside financing. I combine a sector-specific financial shock with detailed data
on the board of directors of firms and find that private firms that are adversely affected by the
financial shock are more likely to have group-affiliated directors take positions on their boards. I
also find that private firms that do not get a group director are significantly likely to acquire
cross-holdings in other private firms, thus integrating horizontally.
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CHAPTER 1
Financial Constraints and the (Mis)Allocation of
Subsidized Credit: Evidence from Export Loans
Summary 1
The provision of subsidized credit to domestic firms is an important policy goal
for many governments, especially in emerging market economies. This paper
uses unique loan-level data from the exports sector in Pakistan to study the
causal impact of credit subsidies on the real outcomes of firms. Exploiting an
exogenous change in loan eligibility, the paper shows that removal of subsidized
credit leads to a 29% relative decline in firm exports, but that this effect is
heterogeneous across different types of firms - exports of large, publicly listed
firms and corporate group firms are unresponsive to the subsidy exclusion, while
those of privately owned firms are highly responsive. Publicly listed firms make
no significant adjustments to assets, equity, capital structure, or long-term
investments, and only their profits are reduced. These results persist over the
long-term, indicating that these firms are financially unconstrained. Nearly 44%
of all subsidized loans prior to the policy change are assigned to publicly listed
firms, which implies a substantial misallocation of credit. The opportunity cost
of these misallocated funds is significant as even the more productive private
firms are financially constrained. The paper also shows that productivity
differences between private and publicly listed firms cannot explain the
heterogeneous response across firms.
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I. Introduction
The provision of subsidized credit to domestic firms is an important policy goal for many
governments around the world. One of the main justifications for these subsidies is that they help
local industries overcome financial market failures, especially in emerging market economies
where such market imperfections are common. Yet, there is little empirical evidence showing
how effective these subsidies are in improving the real outcomes of firms, or how efficiently
these subsidies are allocated across targeted firms - that is, are more financially constrained
firms allocated a greater share of credit?
Credit subsidies for firms operating in export markets are particularly widespread.' The
"miracle" growth of East Asian economies is often attributed to the extremely rapid export
expansion achieved by these countries, which was accompanied by significant government
involvement in supporting exports.2 Some free-trade advocates, however, question the
contribution that export subsidies made in improving the output of East Asian firms, and argue
that the dramatic increase in exports was realized primarily because of favorable macroeconomic
conditions, stable exchange rates, and a strong physical infrastructure (Panagariya, 2000; Little,
1996). Measuring the direct effects of subsidies on firm-level outcomes is hampered by such
identification concerns, and rigorous empirical work on this question is lacking. The literature on
exporting sectors instead focuses on the broader question of whether export subsidies enhance
economic welfare, and provides inconclusive theoretical predictions in terms of cross-country
macro gains and losses.3
This paper estimates the causal impact of credit subsidies on the real outcomes of exporting
firms. This estimation is made possible by using a unique export loan and output dataset from
Pakistan for a panel of five years. The Central Bank of Pakistan provides subsidized loans
through the commercial banking sector to domestic firms that export an eligible set of
commodities. I exploit an exogenous change in eligibility that resulted in the subsidies being
'Banerjee and Newman (2004) incorporate credit market imperfections into a model of international trade and argue
that if poor credit markets are what hold back resource reallocation, then providing capital subsidies to exporting
sectors can enhance export growth.
2 Government support for exporters in East Asia was not restricted to credit subsidies. For instance, Singapore and
Taipei pursued policies of import substitution along with export credit, while Malaysia established duty-free export
processing zones for its local exporters.
Brander and Spencer (1985) argue that under certain market structure conditions export subsidies can enhance
international market share and improve domestic welfare. Bagwell and Staiger (1989) suggest that these subsidies
can help firms signal their product quality to foreign markets. Conversely, Bhagwati (1988, 1996) and Grossman
(1986) argue that export subsidies cause large welfare distortions in the domestic economy.
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discontinued for a specific commodity (i.e., cotton yarn), and compare outcomes before and after
the policy change for yarn and non-yarn textile firms. The results show a large and statistically
significant effect of the removal of export credit subsidies on yarn firms: following the policy
change, these firms are unable to replace their subsidized credit with market-rate loans, and their
exports fall sharply.
Although the average effects on yarn firms are large and statistically significant, there is
considerable heterogeneity in these effects across different types of firms. In particular, the total
loans and exports of large, publicly listed firms and corporate group firms are unaffected by the
removal of credit subsidies, while those of privately owned firms are significantly affected. The
analysis presented in this paper suggests that these differences arise because privately owned
firms are financially constrained by banks, while publicly listed firms and corporate group firms
are unconstrained. The identification of financial constraints comes from exploiting the shock to
the supply of subsidized credit, which as the paper shows, is uncorrelated with the export
performance of yarn firms. This strategy avoids the typical problems associated with using cash-
flow shocks to identify financing rigidities, as cash flow changes are likely correlated with the
investment opportunities of firms.4
If some firms are financially constrained and others are not, then the effectiveness of the
subsidized credit scheme depends on whether the subsidies go to the right firms. This paper
provides evidence that credit subsidies in Pakistan are substantially misallocated. I show that
nearly half of the subsidized credit prior to the policy change is assigned to firms that do not
need it, that is, the unconstrained firms. At the same time, I show that there is a large majority of
privately owned firms that are financially constrained, in the sense that their exports are highly
sensitive to the removal of subsidized credit. In addition, among this latter group, even the more
productive firms are financially constrained, which indicates that the opportunity cost of the
misallocated funds is significant.
The misallocation argument is further strengthened by observing balance sheet changes for
publicly listed firms. The results show that the additional cost of financing after the removal of
credit subsidies is fully absorbed in the "interest expenses" entry in the profit and loss accounts
of these firms. Moreover, there is no significant change in assets, capital structure, long-term
4 The literature on investment-cash flow sensitivities is large. See Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) for an
introduction; Poterba (1988) and Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000) for a critique.
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investments, or total sales, rather only an adjustment in profits. Direct calculations show that the
magnitude of the decline in profits matches almost one-to-one with the increase in borrowing
costs. These findings suggest that the subsidies simply provided the publicly listed firms with an
opportunity to earn windfall profits. Hence, not only are publicly listed yarn firms financially
unconstrained, but the incentives from export subsidies are infra-marginal for these firms - that
is, they would have borrowed the same amount irrespective of the credit subsidies.
This paper argues that the exports of privately owned firms decline sharply because they are
more financially constrained than others. An alternative interpretation of these results is that
privately owned firms are simply less productive than other firms, and that exporting is not
feasible without subsidized credit. Indeed, Bhagwati (1996) and others have argued that export
subsidies are economically wasteful because they aid in the preservation of such "low-quality"
firms. Recent trade literature, following Melitz (2003), also argues that productivity differences
across firms influence the extensive margin of trade. This paper, however, provides evidence
against this alternative interpretation. First, prior to the change in subsidy policy, more than 95%
of firms in the dataset (private, listed, and group) supplement their subsidized credit with some
borrowing at regular market rates from banks. This implies that the marginal product curve for
these firms lies above the market lending rate, and that exporting is still feasible after the
subsidies are removed. Second, the paper directly tests whether productivity differences matter
and does not find evidence that less productive firms are differentially more affected by the
removal of subsidies - that is, the regression coefficient of the interaction between the main
effect and productivity is very close to zero and statistically not significant.
The results of this paper provide some useful policy implications for the design of export
credit schemes in general. While the paper shows that export subsidies help alleviate credit
constraints, it also shows that a substantial proportion of these subsidies are allocated to
financially unconstrained firms. The paper distinguishes which types of firms are unconstrained,
and hence the most important policy implication it provides is that the misallocation of credit is
identifiable.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the export subsidy scheme in
Pakistan, its institutional environment, and the policy change. Section III explains the data, and
Section IV outlines the conceptual framework, identification strategy, and empirical
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specifications. Sections V and VI present results of the empirical analysis. Section VII performs
a series of robustness checks, and Section VIII concludes.
II. Institutional Setting and Policy Change Details
A. The Textile Export Sector in Pakistan
The textile industry in Pakistan presents a particularly relevant setting in which to study the
effects of export credit subsidies. The exporting sector of the country is dominated by the textile
industry, which accounts for 67% of Pakistan's total exports (SBP Annual Report, 2003). These
exporters are price-takers on the international market,5 which allows the quantity effects of
subsidy provision to be identified independent of changes in price. In addition, firms within the
textile industry are heavily export-oriented with more than 70% of industry production sold
overseas.
A large proportion of these textile exports are supported by government loan subsidies
provided under the Export Finance Scheme (EFS). As Table I shows, exports under EFS account
for 38% of country-wide exports and 42% of total exports in the textile sector. Hence, the textile
sector accounts for the majority of Pakistan's exports and is also the main beneficiary of the
government-sponsored subsidy scheme.
B. The Credit Subsidy Scheme in Detail
The Government of Pakistan sponsors and operates the Export Finance Scheme (EFS) through
the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP), which is the central bank of the country. The scheme has been
operational since 1973 and provides working capital loans to exporters of eligible commodities
at subsidized interest rates. The scheme works entirely through the formal banking sector, and
banks earn a fixed 1.5% spread on the loans that they provide under EFS. All banks in Pakistan
face the same regulatory environment, which allows the SBP to operate EFS through the entire
commercial banking sector of the country.6
Credit provided under EFS comprises short-term working capital loans with a maturity of
180 days. Commercial banks extend credit to firms and then receive refinancing from the SBP,
which also monitors and regulates the entire scheme. An original export order is required before
Pakistani Textiles have a 2% share in the global market.
6 As of June 2003, there were 6 government-owned, 24 foreign, and 12 private domestic commercial banks in
Pakistan, all of which participated in EFS.
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a loan can be approved, and copies of this document are forwarded to the regional SBP field
offices at loan signing. At the time of loan repayment, firms are required to submit their sales
invoice along with shipping documents and a customs appraisal letter. Details provided in these
documents are matched with the original export order, and copies are then forwarded to the
SBP.7 Fines are imposed by the SBP if firms fail to provide shipping documents, even if they are
able to repay their loan amounts. Firms with overdue fines are barred from further EFS
borrowing until their fine balances are cleared. The imposition of fines, however, is quite rare -
as summary statistics in Table II (b) show, a fine for late submission is imposed on less than 3%
of all EFS loans, whereas complete non-submission occurs in less than 0.5% of loans.
There is a limit on how much EFS credit any single firm can receive in a year, dependent on
its market valuation. Specifically, private firms are allowed to borrow up to 5 times their capital
and reserves, and publicly listed firms 2 times their capital and reserves. The motivation for these
different limits is that publicly listed firms have access to other forms of financing such as share-
holder equity that are not available to private firms. In addition, each bank is assigned a
sanctioned limit by the SBP based on the size of its equity and reserves, which indicates the
maximum amount of EFS credit it can extend.8
The size of the EFS subsidy on average is 6 percentage points (i.e., market rate - EFS rate =
6%), though in recent years it has been much lower. This subsidized rate of interest, by EFS
rules, is consistent across all banks and firms. Figure I plots the time-series trend in EFS rate
against the market lending rate and the 6-monthly Treasury-bill (T-bill) rate. Up until very
recently, the EFS lending rate was set on an ad-hoc basis, with some functional relationship to
the T-bill rate. Starting in June 2002, however, under pressure from the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) to implement more market-oriented policies, the EFS rate was strictly pegged a few
basis points above the T-bill rate.
C. Policy Change Details
Access to EFS loans is not open to all firms. Specifically, SBP maintains a negative list of
products not eligible for subsidized loans. The range of items on this list is quite diverse, from
7 If the shipping date provided in the original export order is beyond the 180 day loan term, then firms are required
to submit the shipping documents within 30 days of that date.
8 Bank refers to all bank branches in sum. The head-office of each bank provides SBP a schedule of disbursement
that details how much EFS credit each branch is assigned.
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petroleum products and crude minerals to animal hides and fur skins. Interviews with SBP
officials indicate that the motivation for the negative list is to encourage the export of finished
goods rather than basic raw materials.
A major change in the EFS eligibility criteria was announced by SBP in late 2000 and came
into effect in June, 2001. Specifically, in an attempt to focus more on value-added goods, the
SBP decided to exclude the export of cotton yarn from EFS and added it to the negative list. At
the time of the policy change, yarn spinners occupied a very large fraction of the EFS-supported
textile industry - pre-period loans to yarn spinners comprised on average 30% of all EFS loans to
the textile sector. The policy change was announced, retracted, and a revised version issued
through a series of SBP circulars from June to December, 2000. The initial version called for an
immediate cessation of loans for yarn while the revised version, issued very soon afterwards,
allowed the EFS facility to continue until the end of the fiscal year. The data clearly shows that
EFS loans for yarn exports cease abruptly in June, 2001.
The empirical analysis presented in this paper relies on the identification assumption that the
EFS policy change was uncorrelated with prior export performance of yarn firms. It is, therefore,
important to understand the government's motivation for the change in EFS policy. In particular,
the subsidies could have been discontinued precisely because of poor export growth of the yarn
sector, which would imply that the policy change was not exogenous to prior firm performance.
However, I show later in the paper that this was not the case - that is, the growth trend of yarn
exports prior to the policy change was very similar to that of non-yarn exports.
III. Data and Summary Statistics
This paper brings together three original datasets, two of which were collected specifically for
this research. The first has detailed loan-level credit and output information for all exporting
firms operating under the umbrella of EFS from June, 1998 to June, 2003. The second dataset
provides similar detailed loan-level information for total corporate loans given out by banks in
all of Pakistan for the same sample period. Finally, the third dataset consists of detailed annual
accounts for all publicly listed firms in Pakistan for the sample period of interest.
A. Exports Database
The loan-level export database used in this paper provides detailed loan and export output
information for all firms (publicly listed and private) borrowing under EFS. Each row in the
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database corresponds to a firm-loan entry. For each of these entries, the dataset provides
information on exporter name and location, importer name and location, exporter industry and
commodity type, loan amount, export amount, and default amount, if any. Overall, the dataset is
a panel from 1998 to 2003, comprising 97,937 unique loans given to 3,122 unique firms over the
5-year period. The textile sector received 50,661 of these loans, and the sector comprised 1,120
firms. This data constitutes the entire universe of EFS loans and corresponding exports for the
given period.9
As discussed earlier, yarn exporters have been excluded from EFS since June, 2001. Since
the export data is only for firms operating within the scheme, these firms disappear from the
dataset after this date. However, data on total exports for yarn and non-yarn textile firms was
collected from commercial banks for the period June, 2000 to June, 2003. Due to less stringent
reporting requirements prior to 2000, this data was not available for earlier years.
Tables II (a) and II (b) present summary statistics for several loan-level variables from the
EFS data. These include pre-period averaged loan amounts, export valuations, and net fines
imposed for late submission of shipping documents. The figures are reported for all firms and
also separately for yarn and other textiles. Table II (b) shows that the average loan amounts for
yarn are on average much larger than those for other textiles, and correspondingly, average
exports per loan are also greater for yarn.
B. Total Loans Database
The total loans database, like the EFS data, is provided by the SBP and is unique both in terms of
its coverage and detail. It contains yearly information on the entire universe of total corporate
bank loans outstanding in Pakistan for the 5-year panel from 1998 to 2003. The data is at the
level of bank, borrowing firm, and year, and traces the history of lending with information on the
amount of loan and interest outstanding, type of loan (working capital, fixed investment, or
other), and any defaults on these loans. In addition, this data provides information on group
affiliation of firms and the size of these groups. Since the empirical strategy used in this paper
does not exploit differences across banks but rather differences across firms, the total borrowing
and other variables of interest are aggregated to the level of the firm. Firm-level variables
9 Although all available data was extracted from SBP record rooms, some of the earlier year files could not be
located. The unbalanced nature of the panel, however, does not differentially affect any particular group of firms.
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provided in this dataset are matched with EFS firms to create a unified panel spanning 5 years.1'0
Panel A of Table III shows brief summary statistics on total loans and default rates, restricted to
the subset of EFS matched firms. The default rate on loans to exporters is fairly low, with the
7 5 th percentile corresponding to a firm with zero default.
C. Corporate Sector Financial Accounts
While the EFS and total lending databases provide detailed loan and output information, they do
not contain any firm-level attributes such as size of assets, equity, total sales, or trade credit. This
paper supplements these two datasets with corporate annual accounts data obtained directly from
the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP). This database consists of audited
financial accounts for all publicly listed companies for a panel of over 10 years, starting in 1990.
These firms are required by law to file their annual reports with the SECP.
Firms in this dataset are matched with their EFS and total loan information to create a firm-
level dataset with exports, total loans, assets, and liabilities for all publicly listed firms borrowing
under EFS. Panel B of Table III presents summary statistics for some borrowing firm attributes
from the corporate financial accounts data.
IV. Conceptual Framework and Identification
A. Productivity Differences or Credit Constraints?
A large body of trade literature has shown that exporting firms perform better than non-exporting
firms. They are consistently larger, more productive, more capital-intensive, and pay higher
wages. l l Bernard and Jensen (1999a), (2001), and Clerides, Lach, and Tybout (1998) find
evidence that more productive firms self-select into export markets. Part of the reason why we
observe this consistent pattern across countries is that entering and operating in export markets
requires firms to undertake large fixed costs, and only the more productive firms are able to
'0 A name-matching algorithm was used to match firms across the two datasets. This was followed by a series of
manual cross checks to ensure that the match was correct. 90% of EFS firms were successfully matched.
" See Bernard and Jensen (1995), (1999a), (1999b) and Richardson and Rindal (1995) for evidence on US firms;
Bernard and Wagner (1998) on German firms; Aw and Hwang (1995) and Aw, Chung, and Roberts (2000) for
Taiwanese and South Korean firms; and Clerides, Lach, and Tybout (1998) for Columbian, Mexican, and Moroccan
firms.
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cover these costs and still remain profitable.12 Melitz (2003) uses these empirical findings to
motivate a model of trade with firm heterogeneity, where the fixed costs of exporting directly
influence the extensive margin of trade. Under these conditions, export subsidies that reduce
production costs will allow some relatively unproductive firms to enter export markets that
otherwise would not find it profitable to do so. Removing subsidies will induce these same firms
to exit. Hence, fixed costs and productivity differences can explain why the response to removal
of export subsidies may be heterogeneous across firms.
However, an implicit assumption underlying this literature is that firms are uniformly
unconstrained in their access to capital, and that any differences in marginal costs are due to
differences in production technology. This is a very strong assumption, especially in the context
of developing countries where many firms are credit rationed despite having very profitable
projects. Chaney (2005) incorporates credit constraints into Melitz's model and argues that these
constraints prevent even some of the profitable firms from entering export markets. 1 3
The theoretical foundation for the existence of lending limits is well-established. Starting
from Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) who demonstrate that credit may be rationed in equilibrium,
theories of banking with asymmetric information can explain why credit constraints may affect
some firms more than others. Specifically, if banks face information asymmetries when lending
to firms, then the level of the interest rates charged has direct implications for the riskiness of
loans. A higher interest rate may induce only firms with riskier project to demand loans (adverse
selection). These firms are willing to pay high interest rates because they perceive their
probability of repaying the loan to be low. Similarly, a higher interest rate reduces payoffs for
firms and may induce mangers to undertake riskier projects that will yield high payoffs if
successful (moral hazard). Hence, once the subsidies are removed, banks will be willing to lend
at higher market rates only to firms that can credibly signal their good type or ones that can
provide loan assurances. For instance, firms with verifiable performance indicators such as
audited accounts or stock market listings can provide banks with an observable performance
history that can signal their good type. In addition, firms that can offer significant collateral or
12 These fixed costs include the cost of learning foreign regulatory environments, and establishing and maintaining
shipping and distributional channels. Das, Roberts, and Tybout (2004) estimate the initial export market entry costs
to average $300,000 - $500,000 amongst Colombian leather and industrial chemical manufacturers.
13 Specifically, his model predicts that the most productive firms become exporters because they are able to generate
sufficient finances from internal resources, while some relatively less productive firms, for whom exporting would
still be profitable, cannot enter because of credit constraints.
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explicit guarantees for their loans will face lower lending limits since banks will have the option
to seize their assets or demand restitution from their loan guarantors in the case of default.
Differentiating between the productivity view and the credit constraints view is empirically
important, and this paper provides evidence in contrast to the former. The empirical setting of the
paper serves as the first piece of evidence: specifically, the data shows that more than 95% of
firms in the EFS sample supplemented their subsidized loans with regular market-rate credit
prior to the policy change, which implies that the marginal product curve for these firms is
higher than the market lending rate. Hence, exporting would still be feasible for these firms
without the subsidies. Results shown later in the paper (in Table XII) serve as the second piece of
evidence: I directly test whether productivity differences matter, and do not find evidence that
the less productive firms are significantly more affected by the removal of subsidies. In addition,
the focus of my analysis is to study differences across firms on the intensive margin - that is,
firms that remain in the export market after the subsidies are removed. Indeed, if the subsidies
are essential for firms to cover large fixed costs of exporting, then removing subsidies will cause
a large effect on the extensive margin - that is, firms for whom the fixed costs outweigh the
surplus from exporting will simply exit the export market. An overwhelming majority of firms in
the sample, however, remain in the export market after the subsidies are removed, and the ones
that do exit comprise primarily the 5% that were not supplementing their EFS credit with regular
market loans.1 4
These findings suggest that the presence of fixed costs and productivity differences across
firms cannot explain the differential response to the removal of subsidies. Instead, as this paper
argues, the differential response is consistent with varying degrees of information asymmetries
between lending institutions and firms.
B. Identifying Credit Constraints
If access to credit varies across firms after the subsidies are removed, then the effects on total
loans and export output will be very different for firms that are financially constrained by banks
and those that are not. Specifically, a constrained firm will be unable to fully substitute
14 Note that it is possible that fixed costs also affect the intensive margin. For instance, the subsidies could have
allowed firms to export to an additional market, and removing subsidies simply induces them to shutdown
operations for that market only. I discuss this possibility in detail in Section VII, and show that the interpretation of
the main results is robust to this concern.
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subsidized credit with regular market-rate loans once the subsidies are suspended. Total loans
and export output will decline. Conversely, an unconstrained firm will be able to make this
substitution as banks will be willing to lend funds to it at higher market rates. Total loans and
export output will remain relatively unaffected. 15
Since EFS firms finance their exports through both subsidized and regular market-rate loans,
their loan supply curve is represented by a step-function, i.e., they can borrow up to their EFS
limit at lower rates and then have to pay higher market rates if they want to borrow further. The
initial equilibrium with EFS subsidies is shown separately for unconstrained and constrained
firms in panels Al and B of Figure II, respectively. Once the subsidies are taken away,
unconstrained firms will be able to substitute all subsidized loans with market-rate loans. The
effect on the loan supply curve, shown in Panel A2 of Figure II, will simply be that the kink now
disappears, and since the intersection point of the marginal product and loan curves does not
change, the total loans and export output for these firms do not change.
The effect on constrained firms is quite different. By definition, these firms are unable to
substitute all subsidized loans with regular rate loans as they are rationed by banks. Hence, total
loans and export output for these firms decline, and by how much depends on how credit
constrained these firms are. Panel B2 of Figure II shows the change in loan supply curve for
constrained firms, and is drawn for the extreme case where no loan substitution is possible.
Hence, the fully constrained firms are unable to substitute any EFS loans with regular bank
credit, and are only allowed access to their pre-period level of regular bank loans.
It is worth noting that the total loans for unconstrained firms may actually increase after the
subsidy removal. Given that the subsidy provides these firms direct interest savings, the optimal
decision for them is to use these savings to pay down some of their bank debt. Once the subsidies
and the corresponding interest savings are taken away, unconstrained firms will not only have to
substitute EFS credit with regular bank credit, but also increase their bank borrowing that was
previously covered by the interest savings. The direction of change in loans (increase), however,
is opposite from that of the constrained firms (decrease). For clarity, this paper focuses on
changes to export output in order to identify credit constraints. Specifically, export output will
15 This methodology parallels that of Banerjee and Duflo (2004), who use the expansion of a directed credit program
in India to test for credit constraints.
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remain unchanged for an unconstrained firm, while it will decline for a constrained firm. These
sharp predictions provide a framework for evaluating the empirical results that follow.
C. Empirical Methodology
The institutional setting and eligibility change described in this paper allow for an empirical
strategy that compares outcomes of yarn firms with those of non-yarn firms before and after the
policy change. Figure III first establishes that non-yarn firms are a good comparison group: panel
A plots the product level export growth separately for yarn and non-yarn textiles, and shows that
the export growth trends for both groups shadow each other before the policy change and diverge
sharply afterwards.16 Moreover, Panel B plots the difference between the two growth rates and
clearly shows a flat trend prior to policy change and an immediate differential trend afterwards.
This evidence of parallel trends strengthens the identification as it rules out the possibility that
the policy change was enacted precisely in response to poor yarn exports.17
This paper uses different specifications to identify the total loan and export output effects at
the firm-level. While a difference-in-difference specification is adopted for total loan
regressions, this type of framework is not ideal for the export regressions owing to the
differences in composition of data before and after the policy change. Specifically, the pre-period
data consists of only EFS exports, whereas the post-period data consists of total (EFS + Non-
EFS) exports for all firms. This "jump" in the data will be absorbed by the post year dummies in
a difference-in-difference framework only under the identification assumption that the ratio of
EFS-to-total exports does not significantly vary across yarn and non-yarn firms. Instead of
relying on this strong assumption, it is possible to use a much more flexible specification that
allows the relationship between pre and post exports to independently vary within the regression
framework.
The specification for total loan regressions is the following:
Log(Total Loans)t = a- + t + A .(YarnDummy* Post), +e (1)
16 1 have checked and not found a significant announcement effect. Moreover, yarn exports do not show a significant
change exclusive of pre-period trend due to the announcement of EFS policy change in late 2000.
17 Referred to in the labor literature as the Ashenfelter dip, in reference to Ashenfelter and Card (1985) who find that
workers entering training programs are precisely the ones experiencing declining wages.
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where the LHS variable is the log of total loans for firm i in year t. (YarnDummy* Post) , is an
interaction between a yarn dummy (=1 if yarn firm; =0 if non-yarn firm) and a post-period
dummy. ,81 is the difference-in-difference coefficient of interest and measures the relative impact
of EFS policy change on yarn firms. A full set of firm dummies, a,, absorb all unobserved time-
invariant differences across firms, which implies that 8, is measured using changes within the
same firm. The year dummies, S, control for any time-series trends in the data common to all
firms, and e, is the error term. Since the variation in eligibility is at the level of the firm, all
standard errors are clustered at the firm level, which corrects for any time-series correlations in
the data.
The specification for export output regressions is the following:
Log(Post Exports) ,t = t + 1.(YarnDumm y)i + / 2.Log(Avg Pre Exports) + sit (2)
where first the data is reduced to the firm-post-period level. The LHS variable,
Log(Post Exports)t, is the log of post-period exports for each firm i in post period t. ,f8
measures the percentage change in exports of yarn firms relative to the change in exports of non-
yarn firms. The interpretation of 8l is identical to that of a difference-in-difference coefficient,
that is, it provides an estimate of the impact of subsidy removal on the exports of yarn firms
relative to non-yarn firms. Log(Avg Pre Exports), is the log of average pre-period exports for
each firm i, and 82 represents the statistically determined relationship between post and pre
period exports.18 The variable, t, represents post period year dummies and %i is the error term.
D. Yarn Ratio Variable Construction
The use of a firm-level yarn indicator dummy in (1) and (2) is not ideal since it does not
differentiate between firms that export very little yarn from those that produce and export only
yarn. Figure IV shows the density of yarn-to-total exports for all firms in the dataset. The shape
of the distribution confirms that while there are many firms that export all yarn and many that
18 In a difference-in-difference framework, ( = 1) is an imposed restriction, whereas in (2) it is allowed to
independently vary.
20
export none, there are also many diversified firms that export some yarn and some of other
textiles. The indicator variable treats all diversified firms as yarn firms even if yarn exports form
a very small proportion of their total EFS proceeds. In order to provide a more precise measure
of the impact of yarn subsidy removal on firm-level outcomes, this paper makes use of loan-level
information from the pre-period to construct a measure of the proportion of yarn exported by
each firm. This variable is defined as follows:
~Yarn Ratio = Exports (3)
Yarn Exports + Non-Yarn Exports i, PRE
where for each firm i, Yarn Ratio is the ratio of their yarn exports to yarn plus non-yarn exports
under EFS in the pre-period.19 Hence, Yarn Ratio will be equal 1 for yarn-only firms, 0 for non-
yarn firms, and will range between 0 and 1 for diversified firms depending on the ratio of their
yarn to total exports.
The main specifications for total loan and export regressions then become:20
Log(Total Loans) it = %c + 5 + l.(YarnRatio* Post) t + it (4)
and
Log(Post Exports)Jt = t + 8l1. (YarnRatio) + fl2.Log(A vg Pre Exports) + st (5)
V. Results - Main Specifications
A. Average Effects
Table IV presents the results of estimating (1) and (4) for all firms in the sample. The results
show that controlling for all firm-level factors and time trends, the relative effect on total loans
of yarn firms is negative and significant. Moreover, relative to non-yarn firms, the total loans for
yarn firms decline by 19%. This result is significant at the 5% level. Hence, the average yarn
19 The results are robust to alternative measurements of Yarn Ratio, such as using the Yarn Ratio just for 2000-01 -
the period immediately preceding the policy change.
20 The empirical specifications using Yarn Ratio can be derived from an indirect production function of the form:
Y = earna"oka, where Y represents export sales, arnr a t i represents the shift parameter, and k represents working
capital credit. The assumption required to get this form of indirect production function from a Cobb-Douglas
technology is that all inputs are purchased using working capital, and in competitive markets. Since what matters for
the regressions is the relative Yarn Ratio values across firms (and any monotonic transformation preserves order),
the functional form of the indirect production function chosen here is not critical.
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firm is unable to substitute its EFS lending with regular market-rate loans. Yarn firms are also
10% more likely to exit loan relationships with banks, as shown in column 3.
Table V shows the results of estimating (2) and (5) for export output, and the effects are even
stronger. Relative to non-yarn firms, the exports for yarn firms decline by 31%. This result is
significant at the 1% level. Column 3 presents export output results restricting data to only the
intensive margin firms. Conditional on remaining in the bank loan market, the export output for
yarn firms declines by 29% relative to that of non-yarn firms. This result is also significant at the
1% level. Hence, on average yarn firms are unable to fully substitute loans, and their exports
decline significantly. Figure V plots the year-by-year coefficients for total loan and export
regressions and shows a sharp change in slope immediately after the subsidies for yarn are
removed.
Since the export regressions use total firm-level exports in the post-period, an important
concern about product switching can be addressed. The concern specifically is that after the
policy change, yarn firms reorganized their export portfolio toward an EFS-eligible textile, and
used their yarn produce as an input rather than an export product itself. This scenario implies that
firms would have continued to generate export proceeds comparable to before the subsidies were
removed. However, the results find a significant negative effect using total firm-level exports in
the post-period, which suggests that even if such switching occurred, it did not completely
compensate for the removal of subsidies.21
B. Publicly Listed vs. Private Firms
Although the average results for firms show strong and statistically significant coefficients, there
is considerable variation in these results across different types of firms. In particular, this paper
finds that both total loans and exports for publicly listed firms are unaffected by the removal of
credit subsidies.
Publicly listed firms typically keep detailed corporate accounts, which banks can rely on the
evaluate credit risk. The importance of corporate accounts in lending relationships is recognized
by the macroeconomics literature on credit constraints. Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and
Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993) develop business cycle models in which the condition of
21 Data on firm exports differentiated by product is not available for the post-period, so it is not possible to directly
test for product switching.
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borrowers' balance sheets affects the degree of information asymmetry between borrowers and
lenders, and influences the amount of borrowing and investment. Access to audited balance
sheets makes it easier for banks to monitor firm performance and effectively reduces the limit on
the amount of loans available. Further, publicly listed firms are on average larger and more
established than private firms, which enables them to offer greater collateral on their loans.22
These firms also have access to alternative sources of financing such as shareholder equity that
can be mobilized as substitutes for bank debt. This subsection tests whether the removal of
export subsidies has a differential impact on publicly listed and private firms.
As a first step, Table VI presents some summary statistics comparing publicly listed and
private firms in the sample, and shows that publicly listed firms are on average much larger in
terms of both exports and total loans. The average listed firm exports 4 times as much as the
average private firm, while it borrows more than 8 times as much from banks. While the size
differences are significant, yarn export composition is comparable across these two groups.
Among yarn exporters, yarn forms 67% of total firm-level exports on average for publicly listed
firms and 45% for private firms.
Table VII presents the results of estimating (4) and (5) separately for publicly listed and
private firms. The results show that publicly listed yarn firms behave identically to publicly
listed non-yarn firms - the coefficient on both total loans and exports is close to zero and non-
significant. Private yarn firms, on the other hand, have large significant effects with a 20%
decline in total loans and 30% drop in exports relative to private non-yarn firms. Columns (3) -
(4) and (7) - (8) of this table control for differential trends based on size differences across firms.
Since data on total assets is unavailable for private firms, I proxy for firm size by using the log of
average pre-period loans for all firms. This control is introduced non-parametrically in all
specifications: the total loan regressions include the interaction of each firm size decile dummy
with Post, and the export regressions include all the firm size decile dummies. The results show
that the coefficient of interest (YarnRatio*Post) remains stable in all specifications when controls
for size trends are introduced.
Overall, Table VII shows that private firms are unable to fully substitute their EFS borrowing
with regular market loans and their exports decline significantly, which indicates that these firms
22 This finding is consistent with evidence from the corporate finance literature. For instance, Pagano, Panetta, and
Zingales (1998) find that publicly listed firms are larger than private firms and that the likelihood of an IPO is
increasing in firm size.
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are financially constrained. Publicly listed firms, conversely, are unconstrained as their total
loans and exports are unaffected by the removal of subsidies.23
C. Private Group vs. Private Non-Group Firms
Although this paper finds that private firms on average are rationed by banks after the subsidies
are removed, there is a subset of private firms that are able to substitute EFS with regular market
borrowing. Apart from access to verifiable performance indicators, banks may be willing to relax
lending constraints for firms that are able provide credible guarantees for their loans. In
particular, the corporate finance literature finds that firms belonging to corporate groups often
enjoy better access to credit than stand-alone firms. Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991)
show that Japanese firms belonging to industrial groups have close ties with lenders and that
many large banks are in fact their shareholders. These close connections reduce the information
asymmetries between the two and result in better loan access for the entire group. In addition,
group members often share resources and have close product-market relations, which lead to
significant stakes in each others' equities. Gopalan, Nanda, and Seru (2005) show that Indian
business group firms often provide guarantees for the borrowing of other group members
because of reputation concerns. Such guarantees are acceptable to banks as they can restrict
credit access for the entire group in the case of default.24 Similarly, Khanna and Yafeh (2004)
show that Indian business groups often use intra-group loans to smooth liquidity across member
firms.2 5
By dividing the sample into group and non-group firms, this paper directly tests whether
private yarn firms belonging to a corporate group are better able to cope with the removal of EFS
subsidies. Data on group affiliation is provided in the SBP total loans database and is collected
directly from firms by commercial banks at the time of loan signing. It is in the interest of
commercial banks to accurately record such affiliations for their own borrower assessment and
23 Quantile regressions for every 10th percentile indicate significant negative coefficients for private firms starting
from the 1 0th percentile of yarn ratio. For publicly listed firms, the 7 0 th percentile and above show marginally
significant negative coefficients.
24 As in Diamond (1989), reputation concerns imply that group members have an ex ante incentive to avoid default
since it results in their being denied future credit.
25 Also, Khanna and Palepu (2000); Van der Molen and Gangopadhyay (2003); and Shin and Park (1999) examine
the role of internal capital markets in improving external finance access for group firms.
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loan recovery purposes. Conversations with SBP officials confirm that these classifications, at
least in the cross section, are accurate and that group affiliations are generally widely known.
Table VIII p)resents regression results for the main specification separately for group and
non-group firms, restricted to only private firms. Total loans for non-group yarn firms decline by
24% relative to non-yarn firms, and exports fall by 33%. Conversely, total loans and exports for
group yarn firms remain unchanged relative to non-yarn firms. These results indicate that private
yarn firms belonging to corporate groups are financially unconstrained, while non-group firms
are significantly constrained.
VI. Results - Detailed Financial Analysis
A. How do Unconstrained Firms Absorb the Subsidy Shock?
The results on publicly listed yarn firms show that these types of firms are able to continue
exporting at the same rate as non-yarn firms after the subsidies are removed, and that they
manage this by maintaining the same borrowing level. This latter result is particularly interesting
as it provides insight into how these firms absorb the EFS shock. Tables IX-XI use detailed
annual accounts data, available only for publicly listed firms, to explore this mechanism in detail.
First, Panel A of Table IX finds no significant differential change in firm size (as measured
by either fixed or total assets), capital expenditure, shareholder equity, or total sales for publicly
listed yarn firms. There is, however, a significant drop in profits for these firms, indicating that
the additional cost of financing due to higher interest rates on market loans is covered by the
profits of these companies. Next, Panel B of Table IX shows regression results for capital
structure changes and finds that the shares of equity, trade credit, and bank debt remain constant
across the policy change. This is quite a remarkable finding - publicly listed yarn firms make no
adjustments to either equity or trade credit and are willing and able to internally bear the
additional cost of bank loans, which is not a trivial cost. As Panel A of Table X shows, financial
interest expenses form the second largest portion of the cost structure, even more so than
administrative expenses. Moreover, Panel B of Table X finds a 36% increase in financial costs
after the policy change, while other operational costs remain relatively unchanged. Hence, the
absolute increase in production costs is substantial and is fully covered by the profits of these
firms. Estimating the regressions in levels rather than logs indicates that the magnitude of decline
in profits matches almost one-to-one with the increase in financial costs. These results imply that
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access to EFS was essentially an opportunity for publicly listed yarn firms to earn windfall
profits, and that they were not credit constrained. Moreover, the financial incentives from the
subsidies were infra-marginal for these firms - that is, they would have borrowed the same
amount irrespective of the subsidies.
Table XI uses two additional years of balance sheet data and finds that even in the long run,
up to four years after the policy change, publicly listed firms do not make any adjustments to
assets, equity, long-term investments, or sales, and the long-term effect on profits is still negative
and statistically non-discernable from the short-term effect.
B. Misallocation of Credit
The preceding sections identify two important findings. First, publicly listed yarn firms are
financially unconstrained as their exports are unaffected by the removal of EFS subsidies. These
firms make no significant adjustments to their balance sheets, which implies that the subsidies
are simply a profit-making opportunity for them. Second, a large number of yarn firms in the
exporting sector (i.e., the privately owned firms) are financially constrained in the sense that
their exports are highly sensitive to the removal of EFS subsidies. These two findings, combined,
imply a misallocation of export credit. Moreover, given that there are constrained firms in the
exporting sector that will use the subsidies to increase export production, allocating these
subsidies instead to unconstrained firms that evidently use the funds to earn super-normal profits
is a misallocation of credit. The size of this misallocation is substantial: a simple back-of-the-
envelope calculation shows that in the three sample years prior to the policy change, nearly 44%
of all subsidized loans were awarded to publicly listed firms, which represent only 16% of
eligible firms in the dataset.
It is worth emphasizing that the misallocation of credit identified here is with respect to firms
within the exporting sector that are also eligible for EFS financing. Indeed, the opportunity cost
of having an export subsidy program itself may be significant relative to other sectors of the
economy where government spending could instead be directed. This paper does not attempt to
answer this larger question, as it requires one to estimate the returns to investment for other
sectors of the economy, which cannot be done with the available data. Instead, this paper focuses
on the allocation of subsidies across exporting firms provided there is an export credit scheme.
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Evidence presented in Table XII indicates that the misallocation of export subsidies is
particularly costly. The table presents the results of a difference-in-difference-in-difference
analysis based on export productivity, where export productivity is defined as the average ratio
of exports to working capital loans in the pre-period for each firm. Hence, a more productive
firm is one that can produce a larger export output for the same amount of working capital loans,
or alternatively can generate the same level of exports using fewer working capital loans.
As Chaney (2005) emphasizes, more productive firms typically accumulate larger internal
revenues, which they can use as insurance against the removal of subsidies. Hence, the adverse
effects on export output may be less severe for these firms. The results, however, show that this
is not the case: controlling for export productivity does not alter the main effects for either
publicly listed or private firms.26 Focusing on private firms, column 2 of the table shows that the
more productive firms are unable to substitute EFS with market-rate loans, and that the decline in
the export output of more productive firms is the same as the average decline for private firms -
the interaction of the main effects with export productivity is close to zero and non-significant.
These results demonstrate that the opportunity cost of funds allocated to the publicly listed firms
is significant as even the more productive private firms are unable to maintain their export levels
without the subsidies.
Export productivity is a sensible measure of total firm-level productivity in the context of this
paper. Ideally, o)ne would like to estimate the ratio of total sales to total working capital as a
measure of productivity, but balance sheet data for private firms is unavailable. Instead, this
paper uses export productivity, which is a satisfactory proxy measure because, first, firms in the
textile industry and especially firms in the EFS dataset are primarily export oriented - more than
70% of industry wide production is sold overseas. Second, the main source of financing for these
firms is bank credit - even for the large, publicly listed firms that have access to shareholder
equity, bank loans on average comprise 63% of total capital structure. This figure is likely much
higher for private firms as they do not have access to shareholder equity. These facts illustrate
that exports are the main source of sales revenue for firms in the sample, and also that these
exports are financed primarily through bank loans. The ratio of exports to bank loans, therefore,
is a reasonable proxy for firm-level productivity. In addition, the empirical strategy used in this
26 The productivity variable is de-meaned in all specifications, thus the coefficients on Yarn Ratio*Post in total loan
regressions and Yarn Ratio in export regressions still represent the average effects for firms.
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paper compares outcomes for the same type of firms across yarn and non-yarn sectors - that is, it
compares outcomes for private yarn firms with those of private non-yarn firms, and similarly for
other types of firms. Hence, the regression coefficients represent the effects of EFS exclusion for
firms that have access to similar sources of external finance.
VII. Alternate Explanations and Robustness Checks
This section discusses some concerns about the evidence presented in the paper and conducts
robustness checks on the main results. Note first that omitted variables at the firm level such as
managerial efficiency or firm "influence" cannot explain the results since these effects are
absorbed by the firm-level fixed effects. Further, the empirical strategy used in this paper
accounts for any economy-wide or interaction effects that do not differentially influence yarn
and non-yarn firms.
A. Validity of Non-Yarn Textiles as a Comparison Group
1. Are Yarn Firms Simply More Dependent on External Finance?
An important concern regarding the main regression results is that non-yarn textiles may not be a
suitable comparison group. In particular, the large significant effects reported in this paper could
be driven by factors specific to the product "type" (i.e., yarn). In a difference-in-difference
regression framework, this implies that the time effects, which are assumed constant for all
firms, are in fact not the same for yarn and non-yarn firms. For instance, if yarn exports require a
greater level of bank financing than other textiles, then the subsidy removal will
disproportionately hurt yarn firms.27 This, however, does not seem to be the case. Measures of
external finance dependence reported in Rajan and Zingales (1998) suggest that the opposite may
in fact be true - that is, external finance dependence is much lower for yarn spinning than it is for
regular textiles. For unconstrained US firms, their paper reports the dependence ratio,
CAPX - CashFlowC APpX C hlow, as -0.09 for the spinning industry and 0.40 for the textile industry (-0.04CAPX
and 0.14 respectively for mature companies).
27 The subsidy removal may also disproportionately hurt yarn firms if there is a contemporaneous negative shock
that only affects yarn. However, detailed interviews with SBP officials indicate no evidence for such yarn-specific
shocks.
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Although these differences are large, they represent the external finance dependence for the
US manufacturing sector, which may not be representative of the situation in Pakistan. Using
annual accounts for publicly listed firms in the EFS dataset, this paper constructs the same
measures of external finance dependence as Rajan and Zingales for firms that produce just yarn
and those that produce no yarn in the pre-period. For yarn firms, the average dependence ratio is
0.17, while for non-yarn firms, it is 0.24. The relative comparison predicted by the Rajan and
Zingales measure still holds, though the difference between the two figures is fairly small. Taken
literally, these figures imply that the impact of the subsidy removal should be slightly lower for
yarn firms. The results of this paper, however, show a large significant impact on yarn firms,
which strengthens the argument that these firms are financially constrained.
2. Is the Domestic Price of Yarn Affected?
Another concern regarding the main regression results is whether the EFS policy change had an
effect on the domestic price of yarn - that is, the domestic price dropped following the policy
change. Since yarn is an input in the production processes of the comparison group which
consists of textile manufacturers, a drop in production costs may mechanically lead to greater
output and exports for these firms. This would imply that the policy change effects identified in
this paper are over-estimates.
There is direct evidence that rules out this concern. Figure VI plots the time-series trend of
the real domestic price of cotton yarn matched against that of raw cotton. The figure shows that
the two lines virtually shadow each other throughout the time-series, indicating that any changes
to yarn prices are in fact induced by changes in price of raw cotton, a direct input into yarn
production.
3. Where are the Left-Over EFS Funds Allocated?
Another important concern is regarding the EFS funds that are freed up as a result of yarn firms
being excluded from EFS. Which firms benefit from these left-over funds? Indeed, if the non-
yarn textile firms get allocated extra loans precisely because of the policy change, then again the
regression coefficients will overestimate the true policy effect.
It is possible to empirically test for this concern. Since the EFS dataset provides detailed loan
and export information for other industries apart from textiles, one can directly check whether
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these other industries start receiving extra credit allocations following the policy change.
Specifically, this paper runs the following regressions:
Log(Y) i = a, + A.Postt + ei (6)
and
Log(Y) it = a, + at + .(NonTextiles =1 * Post) i + e jt (7)
where Yt in both (6) and (7) refers to either EFS loans or EFS exports. First, specification (6) is
run separately for non-yarn textile firms and non-textile firms in order to estimate the simple
differences in outcomes before and after the policy change for each group.28 Next, specification
(7) estimates the relative difference in outcomes (difference-in-difference) between the two
groups, and where (NonTextiles= 1) is a dummy that equals 1 if firm i belongs to a non-textile
industry and equals 0 if the firm is in textiles and is non-yarn.
The results in Table XIII show that the left-over EFS funds are being allocated outside of the
textile industry. The simple before and after differences in EFS loans, shown in columns 1 and 2,
are significantly positive for non-textile firms, and are non-significant and close to zero for non-
yarn textiles. Similar results hold for EFS exports. Further, columns 3 and 6 show results for the
difference-in-difference specifications and find EFS loans to non-textiles increase by 23% more
relative to non-yarn textiles, and exports by 26%.
B. Fixed Costs and the Intensive Margin
If export subsidies are necessary for firms to overcome large fixed costs of exporting, then the
removal of these subsidies will induce firms to exit the export market, as the costs will now
exceed the surplus. As discussed earlier, the main effects identified in this paper are for firms
that continue to export even after the subsidies are removed. It is possible, however, that fixed
costs directly affect this intensive margin. For instance, the subsidies could have allowed firms to
export to a new market and removing subsidies simply induces them to shutdown operations for
that market only. This effect will show up in the intensive margin as firms will exit only part and
28 Non-yarn textile firms are firms with Yarn Ratio = 0. Although defining the variable in this manner excludes all
diversified firms, I have repeated these regressions by aggregating loan-level data up to the product level, and then
comparing loans given to non-yarn textiles and non-textiles before and after the policy change. The results are
similar to the ones presented in the paper.
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not all of their operations. More productive firms will be able to continue exporting everywhere,
whereas less productive firms will be forced to shut down operations in some markets. This
effect should be observable for all yarn firms, but as the data suggests, it should be especially
strong for publicly listed yarn firms - while the exports of private firms in the pre-period are
concentrated in a few large foreign markets, publicly listed firms are more diversified and serve
several different and sometimes small markets abroad.
Results presented in Table XII already show that differences in export productivity across
firms (publicly listed or private) cannot explain the differential response to the EFS exclusion.
Using balance sheet data to construct more standard measures of productivity for publicly listed
firms, Table XIV adds to the evidence by showing that the interactions of these variables with
the main effects are also not significant. Specifically, the results show that firms that rank higher
in terms of their return on assets, return on equity, sales-to-assets ratio, or net margin do not
respond differently than average to the removal of subsidies. These results suggest that fixed
costs do not significantly affect the intensive margin of firms in the sample.
C. Political Connectedness of Publicly Listed Firms
The results of this paper show that publicly listed firms make no significant changes to their
balance sheets in response to the removal of subsidies. But, these firms may be able to maintain
their exports and bank borrowing simply because their directors have personal connections with
banks. Although having close ties with banks is consistent with lower information asymmetries,
it is possible that publicly listed firms start defaulting more on their loans after the policy change
and are nonetheless able to maintain their credit because of political connections.2 9 This could
explain why there are no adjustments in assets, investments, or capital structure for these firms.
This paper, however, finds that the default rates for publicly listed firms do not change
differentially between yarn and non-yarn firms after the subsidies are removed. In addition, the
absolute levels of default are very low - the 7 5 th percentile represents a firm with zero default.
Even more convincingly, the paper shows that banks do a good job of screening out defaulting
firms even if they are publicly listed. Interacting an indicator of pre-period default with
29 Khwaja and Mian (2005) find strong evidence for politically connected loans in Pakistan. They show that such
preferential treatment occurs exclusively in government bank borrowing and that the default rate for such "political"
firms is differentially high. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Zamarripa (2003) present similar findings for related
lending in Mexico, and argue that firms that have close ties with banks engage in extensive looting.
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YarnRatio*Post and Post, the results in Table XV show very strong negative coefficients on
Default*Post for both publicly listed and private firms. These results imply that any firm that has
defaulted in the past experiences large reductions in its bank loans. Figure VII further shows that
default screening by banks is not correlated with the EFS policy change. Firms that defaulted in
1998-99 experience an immediate reduction in loans in 1999-00 and further reductions in
following years.
These findings are consistent with the theme of this paper. Banks face information
asymmetries when lending to firms, and rely on previous default as an indicator of firm quality.
The default history of all borrowers is directly observable by banks through the Central Bank's
credit register, and future credit access is restricted for firms that default on their current loan
obligations.
VIII. Conclusion
This paper uses a unique loan-level panel dataset from Pakistan to investigate the causal impact
of directed credit subsidies on firm-level exports and capital structure. I explore the variation of
these effects across firms and use insights from the banking and corporate finance literature to
identify firms as financially constrained and unconstrained. The results show that removal of
credit subsidies significantly hurts the exports of small, privately owned firms, while the exports
of large, publicly listed firms and corporate group firms are unaffected. The latter group of firms
is typically able to provide verifiable performance indicators and explicit loan guarantees to
banks, whereas the credit risk of private firms is harder to evaluate and their assets are often
insufficient for loan collateral.
While the paper shows that export subsidies help alleviate financial constraints for the private
firms, at the same time it shows that these subsidies serve as super-normal profits for the publicly
listed firms, which are not financially constrained. Nearly half of all subsidized loans prior to the
policy change are assigned to this latter group, indicating a substantial misallocation of credit.
The fact that the interest rate charged on these loans is lower than the market rate is a mixed
blessing. On the one hand, a lower interest rate makes it possible for banks to lend to private
firms since the incentive and sorting problems are less severe at lower interest rates. On the other
hand, lower interest rates also attract the unconstrained firms to demand subsidized loans, even
though they are able to borrow at market rates. Regardless of the interest rate, banks will prefer
32
to lend first to firms that can provide more loan security (i.e., less information asymmetry).
Hence, even at the subsidized rates, banks will first serve all the publicly listed firms before
anyone else. This fact is clear from looking at the data - the mean ratio of EFS loans to capital
for publicly listed firms in the sample is almost 2, which indicates that the program borrowing
limits for these firms are indeed binding. Given this argument, the allocation of credit subsidies
to publicly listed firms is not very surprising. These firms seize an opportunity to earn windfall
profits, and banks are willing to lend to them up to the limit that the program permits because
these are the least informationally opaque borrowers.
These findings not only indicate a flaw in the design of the subsidy scheme in Pakistan, but
also provide policy implications that are more generalizable. The analysis highlights the risks
involved in having a subsidized credit scheme that does not have strict qualification rules based
on observable firm characteristics, and provides insight into what these firm characteristics might
be. Moreover, the results of this paper suggest that the misallocation of credit is identifiable.
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Figure III: Product Level Trend in Yarn and Non-Yarn Exports
Panel A: Product Level Trend in Total Exports of Yam and Non-Yarn Textiles
0.25
Pre Policy Change +- -. Post Policy Change
0.2
0.15
0.1
0.05
-0.05
-0.1
-0.15
~change in log(yarn exports)
-change in log(non-yarn exports)
Panel B: Pre and Post Policy Change Difference in Yarn and Non-Yarn Textiles
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Panel A of this figure plots the product level change in log (exports) of yarn and non-yarn textiles. where the
variable of interest is total country level exports (i.e. EFS and non-EFS exports). Panel B plots the difference
between the two variables in Panel A.
Figure IV: Yarn Ratio Density
Panel A: Full Sample
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Panel A of this figure plots the density of firm level Yarn Ratio in the pre period. where Yarn Ratio
is the ratio of a firm' s yarn exports to its total (yarn + non-yarn) exports in the pre-period. Panel B
plots the density restricted to firms that export yarn.
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Table I
Pakistan Export Composition and EFS Coverage
(1) (2) (3)
EFS
Total Country Total Exports Coverage
Exports under EFS (%)
Textile Sector 347.45 146.14 42%
Other Commodities 204.65 63.00 31%
All Sectors 552.10 209.14 38%
Figures are in Rs. Billion and correspond to data from 1999-00.
Table II (a)
EFS Data Description
(1)
All Sectors
1998-99 to
Years Covered 2002-03
Total no. of Unique Loans 97,937
% Loans to Textile Sector 51.73%
Textile Sector
No. of Unique Loans 50,661
No. of Unique Firms 1,120
No. of Matched Firms* 978
*This refers to the number of firms successfully matched
with the Total Loans database.
Table II (b)
EFS Data Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max # of loans
Loan Amount (Rs.)
Other Textiles 2,509,215 4,070,170 100,000 172,000,000 27,100
Yarn 4,693,878 7,798,886 100,000 110,000,000 8,948
All Textiles 3,051,882 5,336,440 100,000 172,000,000 36,048
Shipment Value (Rs.)
Other Textiles 3,090,001 4,364,866 104,701 173,000,000 27,116
Yarn 5,408,996 8,178,908 108,633 116,000,000 8,951
All Textiles 3,666,021 5,654,027 104,701 173,000,000 36,067
Net Fine (Rs.)
Other Textiles 184,996 1,025,954 300 20,000,000 750
Yarn 317,847 1,609,918 480 20,000,000 218
All Textiles 214,915 1,183,213 300 20,000,000 968
Net Fine/Shipment Value Ratio
Other Textiles 0.151 0.735 0.00004 6.714 0.027
Yarn 0.109 0.617 0.00002 7.656 0.024
All Textiles 0.142 0.71 0.00002 7.656 0.027
Figures are in Rs. and correspond to loan-level observations in the pre-period (1998-99 to 2000-01).
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Table IV
Are Yarn Firms Able to Substitute to Non-Program Loans?
(1) (2) (3)
Log of Total Log of Total
Loans Loans Exit?
Yarn Dummy * Post -0.117**
(0.046)
Yarn Ratio * Post -0.190** 0.096***
(0.084) (0.029)
Firm FEs YES YES YES
Year FEs YES YES YES
Observations 4299 4299 4890
R-squared 0.922 0.924 0.558
Robust standard errors, clustered at firm-level, are reported in parentheses.Yam Ratio refers to the
ratio of a firm's yam exports to its total (yarn and non-yarn) exports in the pre-period under EFS. The
pre-period consists of 3 years, 1998-99 to 2000-01, and the post-period consists of 2 years, 2001-02
and 2002-03. In Columns (1) and (2), data is restricted to intensive margin firms. Column (3) reports
regression results on the entire sample, where Exit is a dummy= 1 if a firm stops borrowing from
banks in the post-period, and =0 otherwise.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table V
Effect of EFS Eligibility Change on Export Output
(1) (2) (3)
Log of Post Log of Post Log of Post
Period Exports Period Exports Period Exports
Yarn Dummy -0.164***
(0.049)
Yarn Ratio -0.315*** -0.297***
(0.063) (0.074)
Log of Pre Period Average Exports 0.956*** 0.952*** 0.956***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.018)
Year FEs YES YES YES
Observations 2240 2240 1803
R-squared 0.708 0.71 0.686
Robust standard errors, clustered at firm-level, are reported in parentheses. Yarn Ratio refers to the
ratio of a firm's yam exports to its total (yam and non-yarn) exports in the pre-period under EFS. The
pre-period consists of 3 years, 1998-99 to 2000-01, and the post-period consists of 2 years, 2001-02
and 2002-03. All loans in the pre-period (1998-99 to 2000-01) are averaged at the firm level. The
regressions are run on all post periods (2001-02 and 2002-03), and include time dummies for the two
post periods. In Column (3), data is restricted to intensive margin firms.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table VI
Comparing Publicly Listed and Private Firms
(1) (2)
Mean Std. Dev.
Publicly Listed Firms
Export Value (Rs. 000) 176,145 312,627
EFS Loan Amount (Rs. 000) 105,316 240,408
Total Loan Amount (Rs. 000) 468,523 1,138,402
Default Rate (%) 5.32 14.54
No. of Banks 7.68 7.12
Yarn Ratio 0.50 0.41
Yarn Ratio I Yarn 0.67 0.34
No. of Firms 158
Private Firms
Export Value (Rs. 000) 45,474 101,251
EFS Loan Amount (Rs. 000) 20,922 65,157
Total Loan Amount (Rs. 000) 56,505 224,125
Default Rate (%) 7.61 24.34
No. of Banks 2.19 2.67
Yarn Ratio 0.18 0.32
Yarn Ratio Yarn 0.45 0.38
No. of Firms 820
This table presents summary statistics separately for publicly listed firms and
private firms. "Yarn Ratio I Yarn" refers to the average Yarn Ratio only for firms
that export yarn; all non-yarn firms are excluded.
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Table IX
Balance Sheet and Capital Structure Changes for Publicly Listed Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log of Fixed Log of Total Log of Total
Assets Assets CAPX Equity Sales Profits
Panel A: Balance Sheet
Changes
Yarn Ratio * Post 0.07 -0.094 -0.13 -0.081 -0.085 -0.171*
(0.094) (0.175) (0.103) (0.155) (0.103) (0.099)
Firm FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES
Assets * Post YES YES YES YES
Observations 691 691 383 691 691 691
R-squared 0.93 0.937 0.532 0.875 0.947 0.564
(1) (2) (3)
Trade Credit Bank Debt
Equity Share Share Share
Panel B. Capital Structure
Changes
Yarn Ratio * Post -0.025 0.013 0.038
(0.036) (0.037) (0.035)
Firm FEs YES YES YES
Year FEs YES YES YES
Assets * Post YES YES YES
Observations 691 227 691
R-squared 0.735 0.521 0.816
Robust standard errors, clustered at firm-level, are reported in parentheses. Yarn Ratio refers to the ratio of a firm's
yarn exports to its total (yarn and non-yarn) exports in the pre-period under EFS. The pre-period consists of 3 years,
1998-99 to 2000-01, and the post-period consists of 2 years, 2001-02 and 2002-03. In Panel A, dependent variables
in Columns (3), (4), and (6) are normalized by pre-period average total assets. In Panel B, Equity Share refers to the
share of equity in total capital (equity + trade credit + bank debt). The same definition applies for Trade Credit
Share and Bank Debt Share. Assets*Post is an interaction term between Log of Total Assets and the Post dummy.
Data is for publicly listed firms only.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table X
Analysis of the Profit and Loss Account
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Panel A: Summary Statistics
Manufacturing Costs (Rs. Millions) 827.00 1200.00 5.51 14300.00
Financial Charges (Rs. Millions) 72.50 210.00 0.06 3220.00
Administrative & Selling
Expenses (Rs. Millions) 45.50 97.30 0.03 1070.00
Taxes (Rs. Millions) 11.30 17.90 0.07 149.00
Total Cost (Rs. Millions) 841.00 1400.00 6.32 17500.00
Interest Exps / Total Cost 0.13 0.19 0.02 0.84
Total Sales (Rs. Millions) 977.00 1520.00 6.66 16500.00
Net Profit (Rs. Millions) 27.10 225.00 -8.13 1200.00
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log of Manf. Log of Fin. Log of Admin. Log of Wages
Costs Costs Costs per Emp.
Panel B: Where is the Cost Adjustment
Coming From?
Yarn Ratio * Post 0.089 0.355* -0.065 -0.052
(0.117) (0.210) (0.104) (0.170)
Firm FEs YES YES YES YES
Year FEs YES YES YES YES
Assets * Post YES YES YES YES
Observations 691 691 691 691
R-squared 0.947 0.885 0.972 0.795
Robust standard errors, clustered at firm-level, are reported in parentheses. Yam Ratio refers to the ratio of a firm's
yarn exports to its total (yarn and non-yarn) exports in the pre-period under EFS. The pre-period consists of 3 years,
1998-99 to 2000-01, and the post-period consists of 2 years, 2001-02 and 2002-03. In Panel B, Log of Financial Costs
refers to the Log of interest expenses on bank debt. Assets*Post is an interaction term between Log of Total Assets
and the Post dummy. Data is for publicly listed firms only.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table XII
Does Export Productivity Matter?
(1) (2)
Listed Firms Private Firms
Dependent Variable.: Log of Total Loans
Yarn Ratio * Post -0.068 -0.200*
(0.132) (0.121)
Yarn Ratio * Productivity * Post -0.016 -0.009
(0.042) (0.015)
Firm FEs YES YES
Year FEs YES YES
Observations 720 3579
R-squared 0.943 0.897
Dependent Variable: Log ofPost Period Exports
Yarn Ratio -0.038 -0.303***
(0.144) (0.092)
Yarn Ratio * Productivity -0.015 -0.003
(0.068) (0.015)
Log of Pre Period Average Exports 0.993*** 0.940***
(0.037) (0.023)
Year FEs YES YES
Observations 305 1498
R-squared 0.862 0.629
Robust standard errors, clustered at firm-level, are reported in parentheses. Yarn Ratio refers to the ratio
of a firm's yarn exports to its total (yam and non-yarn) exports in the pre-period under EFS. The pre-
period consists of 3 years, 1998-99 to 2000-01, and the post-period consists of 2 years, 2001-02 and 2002-
03. Productivity is the ratio of EFS exports to working capital loans for each firm in the pre-period, and is
de-meaned in all specifications. Total Loan regressions are run on a panel of 5 years and include
Productivity * Post interactions. For Export regressions, all loans in the pre-period (1998-99 to 2000-01)
are averaged at the firm level and the regressions are run on all post periods (2001-02 and 2002-03).
Productivity is also included on the RHS. The sample is restricted to intensive margin firms.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table XIV
Balance Sheet Measures of Firm-Productivity for Publicly Listed Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Log of Total Loans
Yarn Ratio * Post -0.093
(0.126)
0.015
(0.094)
Yarn Ratio * Post * ROA
Yarn Ratio * Post * ROE
Yarn Ratio * Post * Sales Over Assets
Yarn Ratio * Post * Net Margin
Firm FEs
Year FEs
Observations
R-squared
YES
YES
720
0.946
Dependent Variable. Log of Post Period Exports
Yarn Ratio
Yarn Ratio * ROA
Yarn Ratio * ROE
Yarn Ratio * Sales Over Assets
Yarn Ratio * Net Margin
Log of Pre Period Average Exports
-0.045
(0.139)
0.004
(0.115)
-0.093
(0.121)
0.014
(0.075)
-0.066
(0.119)
-0.028
(0.103)
-0.086
(0.123)
0.019
(0.071)
YES YES YES
YES YES YES
720
0.947
-0.047
(0.136)
720
0.945
-0.034
(0.135)
720
0.945
-0.050
(0.139)
0.021
(0.106)
-0.022
(0.110)
0.013
(0.093)
0.995*** 0.997*** 0.993*** 0.995***
(0.044) (0.042) (0.039) (0.041)
YES YESYear FEs
Observations
R-squared
305
0.864
305
0.865
YES
305
0.863
YES
305
0.864
Robust standard errors, clustered at firm-level, are reported in parentheses. Yarn Ratio refers to the ratio of a firm's yarn
exports to its total (yarn and non-yarn) exports in the pre-period under EFS. The pre-period consists of 3 years, 1998-99 to
2000-01. and the posl-period consists of 2 years, 2001-02 and 2002-03. ROA is Return on Assets, ROE is Return on
Equity, Sales Over Assets is the ratio of Sales over Total Assets, and Net Margin is the ratio of Net Profits over Sales;
these variables are de-meaned in all specifications. Total Loan regressions are run on a panel of 5 years and include all
productivity variable interactions with the Post dummy. For Export regressions, all loans in the pre-period (1998-99 to
2000-01) are averaged at the firm level and the regressions are run on all post periods (2001-02 and 2002-03). All
productivity variables are also included on the RHS. Data is for publicly listed firms only.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%: * significant at 1%
Table XV
Do Banks Screen Out Defaulting Firms?
Dependent Variable: Log of Total Loans
Yarn Ratio * Post
Default * Post
Yarn Ratio * Default * Post
Firm FEs
Year FEs
Observations
R-squared
Dependent Variable: Log of Post Period Exports
Yarn Ratio
Default
Yarn Ratio * Default
Log of Pre Period Average Exports
Year FEs
Observations
R-squared
Robust standard errors, clustered at firm-level, are reported in parentheses. Yarn Ratio refers to the ratio of a
firm's yarn exports to its total (yarn and non-yarn) exports in the pre-period under EFS. The pre-period
consists of 3 years, 1998-99 to 2000-01, and the post-period consists of 2 years, 2001-02 and 2002-03. Default
is a dummy = 1 if firms have outstanding non-payment on their loans for more than 90 days in the pre-period,
and =0 otherwise. Total Loan regressions are run on a panel of 5 years. For Export regressions, all loans in the
pre-period (1998-99 to 2000-01) are averaged at the firm level and the regressions are run on all post periods
(2001-02 and 2002-03). The sampe is restricted to intensive margin firms.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
(1)
Listed Firms
-0.064
(0.141)
-0.439***
(0.121)
0.012
(0.266)
YES
YES
720
0.947
(2)
Private Firms
-0.179*
(0.104)
-0.420***
(0.105)
0.080
(0.303)
YES
YES
3579
0.898
-0.258**
(0.102)
-0.463***
(0.103)
0.108
(0.262)
0.927***
(0.023)
YES
1498
0.634
0.023
(0.126)
-0.477***
(0.154)
0.092
(0.289)
0.997***
(0.043)
YES
305
0.865
CHAPTER TWO
Dollars Dollars Everywhere and Not a Dime to Lend?
This Chapter Co-Authored With:
Asim Ijaz Khwaja, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
and
Atif Mian, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago
Summary 2
To what extent are banks successful in intermediating the supply of capital to
firms? In this paper we exploit a large and unexpected liquidity upsurge in an
emerging economy that led to a more than halving of domestic lending rates.
Specifically, the events of 9/11 lead to a large inflow of capital into formal
financial markets in Pakistan, both due to reverse capital flight and increased
remittances, with deposits rates falling by a half in just over a year. At the same
time Pakistan's position as a US ally and the removal of previous sanctions, lead
to likely better prospects for firms. The question we ask is to what extent were
banks able to take advantage of the lower cost of raising funds and increase
lending to firms? The results are very stark. Despite such a large fall in cost of
capital, we find that bank lending to firms did not increase. While large listed
firms grew, their borrowing from banks actually decreased as they substituted
towards equity. In contrast, private firms which did not have access to equity
markets, were unable to increase their bank borrowing and in fact showed greater
financial distress. The results suggest that banks may be limited in their ability to
extend credit - despite a large and sudden drop in the cost of capital, bank
lending shows little increase even several years after.
59
I. Introduction
To what extent are banks successful in intermediating the supply of capital to firms? Does a drop
in the cost of capital ceteris paribus necessarily lead to an increase in lending to firms? The
"Financing Gap" view, which has its foundations in the Harrod-Domar Model,' suggests that
banks are constrained by the supply of liquidity in the economy and therefore are unable to fund
profitable investment opportunities. Increasing the supply of liquidity and the ensuing drop in the
cost of capital will therefore lead to large lending increases. In contrast, a large literature on
credit constraints has documented how bank lending to firms is limited by agency problems
(Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1993; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997). Under
such a view spurring growth through increased bank financing to firms is by no means an
immediate consequence of increased liquidity or lower cost of capital.
In this paper we exploit a unique natural experiment that decreased the cost of capital by more
than half in an emerging economy. Moreover, detailed bank-firm level lending data for the
universe of all loans made in the economy allow us to examine the impact of this positive shock
at the firm level. Specifically, the events of 9/11 led to a large inflow of capital into formal
financial markets in Pakistan, both due to reverse capital flight and increased remittances. At the
same time Pakistan's position as a US ally and the removal of previous sanctions, lead to likely
better prospects for firms. Thus the positive liquidity shock was likely accompanied by a positive
demand shock for producers.
Our findings are very stark. Despite such a large fall in cost of capital, we find that bank
lending to firms did not increase. While large listed firms grew, their borrowing from banks
actually decreased as they substituted towards equity. In contrast, private firms which did not
have access to equity markets, were unable to increase their bank borrowing and in fact showed
greater financial distress. The results suggest that banks may be limited in their ability to extend
credit - despite a large and sudden drop in the cost of capital, bank lending shows little increase
even several years after.
Our results are consistent with a model where banks are unable to extend credit to firms unless
they are offered sufficient collateral for their loans (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997). Even with a
I The Harrod-Domar model follows from Domar (1946). The basic premise of the model is that external flows
coming into a country are converted one-to-one into investment, and that there is a stable linear relationship between
investment and GDP growth.
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sharp drop in interest rates, banks likely could not extend credit to existing borrowers since their
collateral requirements were strictly binding. The liquidity shock did not substantially change the
amount of collateral firms could offer, and therefore their borrowing limits did not improve. Our
results also show that while bank lending did not increase for existing customers, it did go up
significantly for new borrowers and for consumer-finance customers. These findings further
support a collateral-based lending environment, since new borrowers likely had fresh collateral
to offer for their loans, and consumer credit was entirely asset-backed as these loans were given
primarily for real-estate and home purchases.
As a direct test, we check whether at least banks generally lent where the money had the most
value, that is, to industries with the highest Q values. We proxy Q by industry market-to-book,
and find no significant relationship between loan growth and industry Q. Moreover, we do not
find that banks increased their lending substantially to the private corporate sector. For the
publicly listed firms, we find lending in fact decreased after 9/11. This is particularly surprising
as these types of firms typically have better access to capital and can offer other forms of loan
guarantees that private firms cannot. Although listed firms borrowed less after 9/11, we find that
these firms expanded rapidly in real terms - their sales, assets, investments, and profits all
increased significantly. Their equity issuances also increased sharply, which suggests that they
took advantage of the booming stock market and actively substituted equity for debt in their
capital structure.
Our results on publicly listed firms and changes in the equity market are also indicative of the
inability of banks to transmit excess liquidity to the rest of the economy. With banks not being
able to manage the liquidity upsurge despite the drop in the cost of capital, money likely flowed
out of banks and into other markets such as equity and real-estate, pushing their prices up. It is
not surprising, therefore, that although remittance transfers tripled in a two-year span after 9/11,
deposits only increased by an average of 16%.
The findings of this paper strongly indicate the presence of severe credit market frictions,
where banks are unable to increase lending to borrowers despite themselves being flush with
relatively inexpensive capital. This paper adds to the growing body of research that emphasizes
financial frictions and financial transmission channels in emerging markets. While the existing
literature has focused primarily on the role of informational frictions in generating
macroeconomic volatility (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Caballero
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and Krishnamurthy, 2000), our paper studies such market imperfections from a more
microeconomic perspective. Moreover, using a rich loan-level database allows us to conduct our
analysis at the borrower level, and identify the implications of financial frictions on different
types of borrowers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides background
information on the 9/11 liquidity shock, and describes the data. Section III presents bank lending
results, and Section IV provides results for listed firms and the equity market. Section V
performs the Q-test, and Section VI concludes.
II. Background and Data
A. The 9/11 Liquidity Surge
Following the events of 9/11, the Pakistan economy experienced a very large inflow of liquidity
into its formal banking sector. A strict crackdown by the US government and its allies on
informal money transfer agents, which were believed to be channeling terrorist funds, led to a
surge in formal remittance transfers through commercial banks in Pakistan. In addition, there
was significant reverse capital flight as many Pakistanis living abroad panicked and started
sending money back home.2 The real effects of this liquidity shock were substantial: the Central
Bank's foreign exchange reserves reached an all-time high, the foreign currency black market
premium disappeared, domestic interest rates halved, and the local equity and real-estate markets
went into an extended boom.
Table 1 presents flow variables from Pakistan's current account and identifies worker
remittances as the singular source of post-9/11 liquidity flows. While official sector transfers,
foreign direct investment, and portfolio investment remained relatively constant after 9/11,
worker remittances increased by almost 300% in a two-year span between June 2001 and June
2003. Figure 1 (a) uses higher frequency flow data to plot these changes, and shows the persistent
rise in remittances following 9/11. As a direct consequence of this liquidity shock, the foreign
exchange reserves of the central bank, shown in Figure l(b), increased dramatically and reached
an all time high of $10 billion by December 2002 - an increase of over $7 billion in less than two
2 There is a large body of anecdotal evidence, newspaper stories, and interview discussions that suggest that the size
and scope of this reverse capital flow was quite substantial.
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years. In addition, the kerb premium for informal currency markets (Figure (c)) was eliminated
as foreign exchange was no longer in short supply.
At the commercial bank level, deposits saw a large expansion, as shown in Figure 2, recording
an average yearly increase of 16% from December 2001 to December 2003 - the highest
sustained growth in over ten years. Examining the pre-trend suggests that deposits in fact started
growing one year prior to 9/11, but also that the growth was sustained and further increased in
the post-9/11 period. Figure 3 plots domestic interest rates, which dropped precipitously after
9/11, falling from 11% in June 2001 to about 2.5% by June 2003. Hence, the post-9/11 supply
surge constituted not only a quantity shock, but also a price shock.
On the demand side, there is evidence to suggest that firms in Pakistan experienced a
simultaneous and positive demand shock. The cooperation of the Pakistani government with the
US, especially in relation to the war in Afghanistan, led to a substantial removal of previous
sanctions on the country's productive sectors. Direct evidence comes from looking at equity and
real-estate markets, both of which experienced significant booms. Figure 4 plots the Karachi
Stock Exchange price index for publicly listed firms, and shows a sharp and persistent rise in
stock prices following 9/11. Real-estate prices also rose steeply, with land and house values in
some sought-after urban areas increasing by more than 100%. Publicly listed firms actively
issued new equity, and thus benefited from the increase in stock prices. These firms also showed
significant real improvements with increases in total assets, sales, profits, and investment.
B. Data
The primary data in this paper comes from the Central Information Bureau (CIB) of the Central
Bank of Pakistan which supervises and regulates all banking activity in the country. The data has
half-yearly loan-level information on the entire universe of corporate bank loans outstanding in
Pakistan between June 1996 and June 2003. It follows the history of each loan with information
on the amount and type of loan outstanding, default amounts and duration. In addition, it also has
information on the name, location and board of directors of the borrowing firm and its bank. We
combine this data with annual balance sheet information on banks and publicly listed firms.
The bank balance sheets data comprises year-end annual reports for all commercial banks
operating in Pakistan, and is also provided by the Central Bank. This paper supplements these
datasets with corporate annual accounts data for publicly listed firms in Pakistan, which is
63
obtained directly from the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP). This
database consists of audited financial accounts for all publicly listed companies for a panel of
over ten years, starting in 1990. These firms are required by law to file their annual reports with
the SECP.
In terms of data quality, our personal examination of the collection and compilation
procedures, as well as consistency checks on the data suggest that it is of very good quality. CIB
was part of a large effort by the central bank to setup a reliable information sharing resource that
all banks could access. Perhaps the most credible signal of data quality is the fact that all local
and foreign banks refer to information in CIB on a daily basis to verify the credit history of
prospective borrowers. For example, we checked with one of the largest and most profitable
private banks in Pakistan and found that they use CIB information about prospective borrowers
explicitly in their internal credit scoring models. We also ran several internal consistency tests on
the data such as aggregation checks, and found the data to be of excellent quality. As a random
check, we also confirmed the authenticity of the data from a bank branch by comparing it to the
portfolio of that branch's loan officer.
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the variables of interest for the CIB loan data-base and
the bank and firm balance sheets. Since we are interested in analyzing changes at the firm level,
we collapse the CIB data to the firm-period level, where each period refers to a 6-monthly
interval from June 1996 to June 2003. Panel A of Table I gives summary statistics for the CIB
variables. These include amount of loan outstanding and the rate of default, which are reported
for all firms and then separately for publicly listed and private firms. The table shows that while
less than 1 percent of firms in the economy are publicly listed, they receive more than 20 percent
of overall lending both before and after the 9/11 shock.
Panel B reports some salient statistics from the listed firm balance sheets. Comparing mean
values across time, the table shows that listed firms experience substantial growth in assets,
equity, sales, and investment after the 9/11 shock, while their bank loans - as reported in panel A
- actually decline.
Finally, Panel C presents summary statistics on bank-level deposits, advances, and
government security investment. The sharp increase in deposits after 9/11 is indicative of the
positive inflow of liquidity into Pakistani banks. Changes at the bank-level are what we first
examine in the next section.
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III. Results - Bank Lending
The sharp drop in the cost of capital, accompanied by a favorable demand shock to the economy
suggests that the demand for bank loans by the corporate sector in Pakistan likely increased. This
section explores changes in the level and composition of bank lending, and finds some very stark
results.
Figure 5 presents the sector-wise growth rate of bank loans in Pakistan. Surprisingly, the
amount of loans to the corporate sector did not increase proportionately after 9/11, and in fact
decreased for the publicly listed firms. In contrast, consumer credit rose very sharply with the
total outlay almost doubling in a two-year span following the liquidity shock. These findings
highlight a failure at the bank level to transmit remittance flows to the productive sector, and
moreover suggest that banks may be limited in their ability to extend credit to firms despite the
sharp drop in the cost of capital.
What is particularly surprising about these results is that lending to publicly listed firms
declined significantly more than the rest of the corporate sector. Table 3 presents within-firm
regression analysis for the growth rate of loans. The regression specifications are the following:
Log(Total Loans)it = aci+ ,ll .POST + s, (1)
and
Log(Total Loans)it = ai + Y .POST+ ,2.LISTED* POST+ e# (2)
where POST is a dummy = 1 for four 6-monthly periods post-9/11, LISTED is a dummy =1 for
publicly listed firms, and a i 's are firm dummies representing firm fixed effects. All error terms
are clustered at the firm level.
The results show that while total lending in the economy reported a meager growth rate of
1.5%, loans to publicly listed firms actually declined by 4%. If anything, publicly listed firms
should have been borrowing more since informational rigidities are typically less severe for
them. Publicly listed firms keep detailed corporate accounts, which banks rely on to evaluate
credit risk. The importance of corporate accounts in lending relationships has been recognized by
the macroeconomics literature on credit constraints. Bemanke and Gertler (1989) and Greenwald
and Stiglitz (1993) develop business cycle models in which the condition of borrowers' balance
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sheets affects the degree of information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders, and
influences the amount of borrowing and investment. Access to audited balance sheets makes it
easier for banks to monitor firm performance and effectively reduces the limit on the amount of
loans available. Further, publicly listed firms are on average larger and more established than
private firms, which enables them to offer greater collateral on their loans. One explanation for
why loans to publicly listed firms declined is that their demand for loans went down - with the
equity market booming, these firms may actively have been substituting equity for debt. We will
explore this possibility in greater detail in the next section.
Focusing now on the private sector firms, Table 3 shows that not only was loan growth
relatively flat for these firms, but also that their default rates increased significantly. Hence,
private firms exhibited greater levels of financial distress after 9/11. We first explore whether
borrower size played a role in lending patterns. Table 4 presents regression results for loan
growth, split by firm size. Here again we find some surprising results. While the loan growth for
medium and large firms remained relatively flat, it was positive and significant for small firms.
Default rates, however, increased for all size categories in the same proportion - by about 2%.
Hence, although lending did increase for the smallest firms, all private firms exhibited some
degree of financial distress.
The small firm loan growth, coupled with the rapid increase in consumer financing, suggests
that most of banks' new lending was focused on smaller borrowers. In addition, the composition
of lending shifted substantially towards newer borrowers. Figure 6(a) plots the number of new
borrowers entering loan relationships in each period, and shows a sharp upward trend after 9/11
both for consumers and private firms. Similarly, Figure 6(b) plots the growth rate in loan
amounts to new borrowers and shows a similar upward trend, particularly for consumer loans.
These findings strongly suggest that the increase in bank lending after 9/11 was focused
primarily on either existing small firms or new borrowers. The Central Bank's own Annual
Review of the Economy Report (2002-03) supports these findings:
"... the strong deposit growth together with the easy monetary stance of the SBP
contributed to a sharp decline in domestic interest rates. This large reduction in
interest rates initiated a resurgence of credit demand.. evidence [for higher
credit demand] clearly points to a strong contribution of new economic activity as
well as the aggressive marketing of consumer credit by the banks."
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The results above are consistent with a banking sector facing severe agency problems in its
lending decisions, and one in which banks are only able to offer collateralized loans. Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997) construct a model of a dynamic economy in which lenders cannot force
borrowers to repay their debts unless the debts are secured through collateral. Under such a
setup, firm assets serve a dual purpose: that of productive activity and of loan collateral. Our
finding that lending to medium and large private firms does not increase indicates that banks
were already lending to these firms up to the limit prior to 9/11, as established by the level of
information problems and collateral provision. The liquidity shock did not substantially change
the amount of collateral firms could offer, and therefore their borrowing limits did not improve.
In fact, their positions slightly worsened as default rates went up.
The result that lending does increase for small firms suggests that, prior to the liquidity shock,
lending to these firms was limited not by the availability of collateral, but rather by bank-level
liquidity constraints. That is, banks were likely not lending to these firms because they
themselves were deposit-constrained. This is not an unexpected finding. Khwaja and Mian
(2006) document the significant decline in banking sector liquidity following the nuclear tests
conducted by Pakistan in May 1998 and the economic sanctions that ensued. Following the
liquidity inflow from the 9/11 shock, banks no longer faced liquidity shortages and therefore
were likely willing to extend credit to small firms.
The finding that banks significantly increased their lending to new private borrowers and
consumers further supports the theory based on information problems and loan security. Having
reached the lending capacity for existing borrowers, banks likely offered loans to new borrowers
who could in turn offer fresh collateral for their loans. Consumer financing, also, was completely
asset-backed as these loans were given primarily for real-estate and home purchases.
IV. Results - Listed Firms and the Equity Markets
In this section, we return to the analysis of publicly listed firms and explore the likely reasons
why lending to these types of firms decreased after 9/11. First, we should point out that even
under a model of fully-collateralized loans, lending to listed firms should have at least remained
the same, if not increased since these firms are able to offer other forms of loan assurances such
as audited balance sheets, that private firms cannot offer. Results in Table 3 also confirm that
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loan default for listed firms did not increase after 9/11. Why then did borrowing for these firms
decline significantly?
What makes this finding particularly stark is that even though listed firms borrowed less after
9/11, they in fact grew very fast in real terms. Table 5 presents regression results for several
balance sheet variables of interest and shows that total investment, assets, and sales for these
firms all increased by significant amounts after 9/11. Figure 7 plots the year-by-year coefficients
for these regressions and shows a steep increase in slope for all real variables, and a negative
change in slope for bank loans. The rapid growth of listed firms lends strong support to the
notion that the 9/11 liquidity shock was accompanied by a positive demand shock to the
economy.
The fundamental question that arises then is how were listed firms able to grow so fast, yet
borrow less? The answer comes from looking at the equity market. Note first that we have
already shown earlier in the paper (see Figure 4) that stock prices for listed firms were booming
after 9/11. Second, the regression analysis in Table 5 shows that listed firms were actively
issuing new equity. While bank loans declined by 6%, equity issuances increased by 13%. These
findings suggest that firms were taking advantage of the booming stock market and actively
substituting towards equity in their capital structure.
The fact that equity markets were booming after 9/11 may itself be indicative of a failure at
the bank-level to transmit liquidity to the productive economy. As we have shown before, while
remittance inflows increased by over 300%, bank deposits on average only increased by 16%,
which is indicative of the inability of banks to sustain deposits. Money flowed out of the banking
sector and into equity and real-estate sectors, likely leading to large speculative bubbles in both
markets.3 In sum, our results show that banks were mostly unable to carry out their function of
transmitting excess liquidity to the rest of the economy despite a large drop in the cost of capital,
which resulted in money flowing out of the banking sector and into other markets, such as equity
and real-estate.
3 Recent newspaper accounts suggest that the real-estate bubble eventually burst, as land prices began a downward
trend around August 2004. Equity market prices also started trending downwards in the last quarter of 2003, as
shown in Figure 4.
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V. Results - Lending to the Highest Q?
The analysis in the previous sections suggests that banks are unable to extend lending to firms
because of information asymmetry problems. One way to directly test this market imperfection
hypothesis is to see whether at least banks generally lend where the money has the most value -
i.e. to industries with the highest market-to-book values. We construct a test based on the Q-
theory of investment, which suggests that under no market imperfections, new money flowing
into the banking sector should first be lent to the highest Q sectors, and that the lending criteria
for banks be dependent on Q.
Using detailed stock price data and balance sheets for all publicly listed firms in Pakistan, we
construct measures of industry Q based on data prior to 9/11, after 911, and the difference in
prices across 9/1 1. We then estimate the following industry-bank level specification for loans to
private firms:
Log(Post 9/11 'Bank Loans)- Log(Pre 9/11 Bank Loans)= a + / 1.Log(Q)+ ,82.X + t (3)
where ,B represents the elasticity of loan growth with respect to different measures of industry
Q, X is a vector of bank and industry level controls, a is a constant, and Ei is the error term.
Standard errors are clustered at the industry level.
The results of this regression analysis are presented in Table 6. We find that not only are the
coefficients not significant, but also that they are very close to zero in terms of magnitude.
Hence, we do not find any significant relationship between industry Q and bank lending after
9/11.
While the Q-test results support our earlier findings regarding the presence of severe lending
rigidities, we should point out a limitation of our Q measure. Since we are using data from
publicly listed firms to construct our measure of Q, the identification assumption we are making
is that private sector Q within the same industry is correlated with the publicly listed Q. While
we acknowledge that there are differences between listed and private firms, the 9/11 demand
shock was likely not restricted to just the publicly listed firms. Moreover, it is very likely that the
demand shock was correlated within the same industry across listed and private firms.
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VI. Conclusion
This paper exploits a very large and exogenous liquidity shock to the financial sector in an
emerging economy, and investigates changes in bank lending behavior as well as changes in
firm-level realizations. Specifically, the events of 9/11 lead to a large inflow of capital into
formal financial markets in Pakistan, both due to reverse capital flight and increased remittances,
with deposits rates falling by a half in just over a year. Despite this sharp reduction in the cost of
capital, we find that banks did not increase their lending substantially to the corporate sector, and
rather focused more on extending loans to new borrowers or consumer-finance customers.
Surprisingly, we find that lending to publicly listed firms in fact decreased after 9/11, and that
these firms actively substituted towards equity in their capital structure. In real terms, the listed
firms registered significant growth in their sales, investments, assets, and profits, while stock
markets also boomed.
These results indicate severe lending rigidities in the banking sector and suggest that banks
may be unable to transmit positive financial shocks to the rest of the economy despite large
reductions in interest rates. Excess liquidity, therefore, flows out of the banking sector and into
other markets such as equity and real-estate, where prices increase sharply. Firms that have
access to such markets (i.e. the publicly listed firms) really benefit as they can substitute out of
bank loans and into these other markets. Other firms that do not have access to such alternative
markets (i.e. the private firms) fail to directly benefit from such large-scale liquidity shocks, and
in fact exhibit greater financial distress.
These results present some stark implications of positive financial shocks in emerging
markets. While those firms that have good access to alternative financial markets may benefit
from bank-level frictions, other firms lose out. Unfortunately, the ratio of winners and losers is
extremely uneven, as publicly listed firms typically comprise only a small fraction of the
corporate sector in emerging economies.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
PANEL A: CIB DATA
All Firms:
Loan Size (000's of Pak Rs.)
Default Rate (%)
Listed Firms:
Loan Size (000's of Pak Rs.)
Default Rate (%)
Private Firms:
Loan Size (000's of Pak Rs.)
Default Rate (%)
Pre-9/11
Mean
23,429
22.91%
708,496
16.79%
17,860
22.96%
Std. Dev.
334,829
38.37%
2,278,864
32.34%
258,819
38.41%
Percent of Total Firms
Pre-9/11 Post-9/11
0.6% 0.5%
99.4% 99.5%
Listed Firms
Private Firms
Post-9/11
Mean Std. Dev.
21,244 338,350
22.35% 37.87%
630,012 1,691,467
19.07% 34.62%
17,030 304,791
22.38% 37.89%
Percent of Total Lending
Pre-9/11 Post-9/11
24.4% 20.4%
75.6% 79.6%
PANEL B: LISTED FIRM BALANCE SHEETS
Pre-9/11 Post-9/11
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
(000's of Pak Rs.)
Total Assets 1,761,778 8,036,083 2,006,133 7,620,650
Total Equity 356,670 2,527,458 415,098 2,538,362
Total Sales 1,666,840 6,223,278 2,506,027 10,081,970
Total Investment 60,843 243,620 123,019 478,375
Total Profits (Before Tax) 72,099 1,076,198 98,139 1,555,288
PANEL C: BANK BALANCE SHEETS
Pre-9/11 Post-9/11
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
(00oo0 s of Pak Rs.)
Total Deposits 32,732,060 64,855,090 44,245,760 81,118,340
Total Advances 20,832,410 38,252,930 28,920,390 45,905,210
Total Government Security Investment 8,652,366 15,988,000 12,840,870 26,582,790
NOTES:
The Pre-9/11 CIB statistics represent 4 half-yearly periods December 1999 - June 2001
The Post-9/11 CIB statistics represent 4 half-yearly periods December 2001 - June 2003
The Pre-9/11 Balance Sheet statistics represent 3 years December 1998 - December 2000
The Post-9/11 Balance Sheet statistics represent 3 years December 2001 - December 2003
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CHAPTER THREE:
Access to Finance and Industrial Composition in
Emerging Markets
Summary 3
Does access to financial services affect the composition of industries in emerging
markets? Is the ownership structure of firms affected by the level and ease of
obtaining outside financing? In this paper, I combine a sector-specific and
exogenous financial shock to Pakistan's textile industry with detailed data on the
board of directors of all firms in Pakistan to address these questions. Specifically,
the paper focuses on the expansion of business groups and studies whether
private firms that are adversely affected by the financial shock are more likely to
have group-affiliated directors take positions on their boards. I find that such
firms are 14% more likely to accept a group director from within the textile
industry onto their boards, and that such directors acquire substantial equity in
the firm. In addition, I find that private firms that do not get a group director are
significantly likely to acquire cross-holdings in other private firms, thus
integrating horizontally. Interestingly, these results do not hold for firms that are
hit by a positive financial shock - group directors are not more likely to assume
board positions in such firms. These results suggest that the expansion of
corporate groups in emerging economies is directly influenced by the ability of
firms to obtain access to external finance.
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I. Introduction
Does access to financial services affect the composition of industries in emerging markets? Is the
ownership structure of firms affected by the level and ease of obtaining outside financing?
Answers to these questions can provide insight into the dynamics of firm formation and growth,
especially in context of economies where access to outside finance is fairly restricted.
This paper addresses these questions by studying the expansion of Pakistani business groups
amongst firms that experience a substantial and exogenous financial shock. While the existing
literature has closely examined the role of business groups in emerging markets (Berglof and
Perotti 1994, Chang and Choi 1998, Hoshi et al. 1991, Khanna et. al. 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001),
the lack of good data has generally restricted such analysis only to a small fraction of firms in the
economy, normally the large publicly listed ones and their affiliates.
This paper exploits a new dataset that provides detailed director ownership information for
the entire universe of firms borrowing from any lending institution in Pakistan for a panel of 5
years, 1999-2003. The dataset also contains information on business group affiliations at the
director level, which makes it possible to identify "group" and "non-group" directors across
firms and over time. The financial shock studied here is the removal of subsidized credit for a
specific corporate sector in Pakistan, as described in detail in Zia (2006). The Central Bank of
Pakistan provides subsidized loans through the commercial banking sector to domestic firms that
export an eligible set of commodities. I exploit an exogenous change in eligibility that resulted in
the subsidies being discontinued for a specific commodity (i.e., cotton yarn), and compare
outcomes before and after the policy change for yarn and non-yarn textile firms. The results in
Zia (2006) show heterogeneous effects with exports and loans of private stand-alone firms being
the most significantly affected. This paper restricts the sample only to these private firms (both
yarn and non-yarn) and studies changes to their board of directors after the financial shock.
There are several reasons why private firms that are hit by the financial shock may benefit
from joining a business group. First, being affiliated with a business group can help firms
overcome credit market failures, which are common in emerging economies. Private firms can
benefit from being part of a large diversified business group that can act as an intermediary
between individual firms and imperfect markets. For instance, groups can use their past record
and reputation in their established lines of business to gain credibility with formal lending
institutions. In addition, as Khanna and Palepu (2000b) argue, the scale and scope of groups can
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allow business groups to internally replicate the functions provided by financial institutions, and
firms affiliated with such groups can, therefore, overcome their external financial constraints by
accessing internal group funds.
Alternatively, there are several reasons why the costs of group affiliation may exceed the
potential benefits. Conflicts of interest may arise in a diversified organization between the group
ownership and minority shareholders, which may result in a misallocation of capital with the
cash flow generated by profitable group firms being invested in unprofitable projects (Khanna
and Rivkin, 2001). Bertrand, et. al. (2002) find evidence of significant tunneling of resources
from minority firms back to the central group ownership. Similarly, Johnson et al. (1999) show
evidence of managerial stealing among East Asian groups during poor economic times. Such
problems may be exacerbated in an emerging market context because of generally weak
disclosure requirements and ineffective corporate governance mechanisms (La Porta et. al.,
1998).
Given these contrasting views on business groups, the issue of whether group affiliation is
beneficial for private firms is not clear cut. In context of this paper, private firms for whom
financial subsidies are removed may be able to regain access to finance by joining a business
group, but at the same time may be reluctant to do so, given the negative effects outlined above.
The empirical analysis of this paper shows that yarn firms are more likely than non-yarn firms to
accept a director with group affiliations (henceforth a group director) on their board after the
subsidy removal. However, this effect is statistically significant only when the sample is
restricted to directors from within the textile industry - a yarn firm is 14% more likely than a
non-yarn firm to accept a group director from within the textile industry. This result suggests that
the expansion of business groups is concentrated among firms within the same industry, where
the preferences of individual private firms are likely better aligned with the overall objectives of
the group.
This paper also shows that the expansion of groups is driven largely by privately held groups.
That is, yarn firms are more likely to accept group directors that belong to privately held firms as
compared to those that have affiliations with publicly listed firms. Publicly listed firms in this
sample are on average much larger than the private firms, and also have much greater ownership
stakes in the groups that they belong to. A likely interpretation of the result presented above is
that private firms are more likely to join groups where the ownership stakes are more evenly
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divided, and not concentrated in the hands of one large firm, where the threat of expropriation of
minority shareholders may be greater.
In addition, the finding that private firms accept group directors significantly more when they
are hit by an adverse financial shock suggests that, independent of the shock, becoming part of a
group is somehow privately inefficient for these firms. Moreover, if becoming part of a group
was an efficient outcome for firms, then they would have joined business groups even before the
financial shock. This line of reasoning suggests that being an independent enterprise likely
accrues private rents for the firm managers, and that they are likely to resist group ownership
structures, where managerial decisions are often made by the central group leadership rather than
by individual member firms (Khanna and Rivkin, 2001). Further, this view suggests that a
negative financial shock likely forces private firms to accept group managers as they have no
other financing options available. The results presented in Zia (2006) already show that private
firms for whom subsidies are removed are significantly credit constrained. Hence, it seems likely
that the private rents to firm managers from independent ownership are likely outweighed due to
severe financial constraints.
Interestingly, the business group effects identified above for an adverse financial shock do
not hold when private firms experience a positive financial shock. As described in Zia (2006),
while yarn firms in the textile industry experienced a cessation of their subsidized financing, the
amount of subsidies were simultaneously increased for firms in the computer/IT, electronics, and
surgical equipment industries. Yet, this paper finds that these firms are not more likely to accept
group directors on their boards, as compared to firms for whom the subsidies remain constant.
These results further support the arguments made in the previous paragraph. Moreover, the
finding that private firms are more likely to join business groups when they are hit by a negative
financial shock and not so when they are hit by a positive shock, points to some inefficiencies of
group ownership from the perspective of the private firms.
These findings are consistent with the view that it is likely inefficient for firms to join
business groups, but that they have no choice but to accept group directors when they are hit by a
negative shock as they are otherwise severely financially constrained. Further, the results
discussed earlier show that private firms are selective in the type of groups they become part of,
and are more likely to join groups within their industry and groups that are privately held.
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Overall, these findings suggest that the expansion of corporate groups is directly influenced by
the ability of firms to obtain financial access.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a summary description of the
export subsidy scheme in Pakistan, its institutional environment, and the policy change. Section
III explains the data and methodology, and Sections IV-VII present the analysis and results.
Section VIII concludes.
II. Institutional Setting and Policy Change Details - A Brief Summary'
The exporting sector of Pakistan is dominated by the textile industry, which is also the main
beneficiary of the government sponsored subsidized credit scheme, namely the Export Finance
Scheme (EFS). This scheme is supervised by the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP), which is the
central bank of the country, and is implemented entirely through the commercial banking sector.
The EFS is a non-conventional subsidy program in the sense that all of the credit risk is
borne by the commercial banks, and therefore the banks themselves are responsible for borrower
selection and screening. In return, they earn a spread from the central bank, which is fixed at
1.5% of the value of the loan. The size of the EFS subsidy on average is 6 percentage points (i.e.,
market rate - EFS rate = 6%), though in recent years it has been much lower. This subsidized rate
of interest, by EFS rules, is consistent across all banks and firms.
Access to EFS loans is not open to all firms. Specifically, SBP maintains a negative list of
products not eligible for subsidized loans. A major change in the EFS eligibility criteria was
announced by SBP in late 2000 and came into effect in June, 2001. Specifically, in an attempt to
focus more on value-added goods, the SBP decided to exclude the export of cotton yarn from
EFS and added it to the negative list. At the time of the policy change, yarn spinners occupied a
very large fraction of the EFS-supported textile industry - pre-period loans to yarn spinners
comprised on average 30% of all EFS loans to the textile sector. Analysis presented in Zia
(2006) shows that this policy change was uncorrelated with the prior export performance of yarn
firms. Moreover, the growth trend of yarn exports prior to the policy change was very similar to
that of non-yarn exports.
This section is a condensed version of what appears in Zia (2006). For more details on the institutional
environment and EFS policies, please refer to the aforementioned paper.
93
III. Data and Methodology
This paper supplements the data on EFS export loans used in Zia (2006) with detailed
directorship data for all firms in the Pakistani Economy for the period 1999-2003. This dataset
was provided by the Central Information Bureau (CIB) of the State Bank of Pakistan.
The directorship data contains detailed information on the board of directors of all firms
borrowing at any given period from any formal lending institution in Pakistan. It is compiled at
6-monthly intervals, resulting in eight periods of observations per firm from June 1999 to June
2003. The database provides the full name, national identification card (NIC) number and full
father's name for every board of director of the firm, which allows for the unique identification
of directors over time. In addition, the database provides information on the percentage of firm
equity the directors' own.
The dataset also provides information on group affiliation at the firm level, which allows for
the identification of "group" directors and "non-group" or "private" directors. A director is
identified as a group director if he or she sits on the board of any group firm in the pre-period.
Conversely, a private director is identified as one who only sits on the board(s) of private firm(s)
in the pre-period. 2
The full directorship dataset provides information for over 100,000 unique firms and more
than 250,000 unique directors. For the purposes of this paper, I have restricted the sample only to
private, stand-alone (i.e. not group-affiliated) firms in the textile industry that were part of the
Export Finance Scheme in the pre-period. Within this sample, the analysis of this paper exploits
the variation in director movement across yarn and non-yarn firms before and after the EFS
policy change. This restricted sample contains 754 firms, 2,654 directors, and a total of 13,247
observations over the entire panel.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for this data. The sample is divided into four 6-monthly
pre-periods from December 1999 - June 2001, and four 6-monthly post-periods from December
2001 - June 2003. While the average per-director ownership remains relatively stable for private
directors, the firm-level share of private director ownership declines in firms that get a group
director in the post-period and increases in firms that do not get a group director in the post-
period. At the same time, group directors that do take up positions in private firms in the post-
2 This methodology for identifying group directors results in some cases (very few) where a "group" director also
sits on the board of a "private" firm (i.e. a firm that has not been identified as a group firm in the database). For
consistency, these types of firms have been excluded from the analysis that follows.
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period do buy ownership stakes as well, owning on average 40% of the firm. The analysis that
follows explores these preliminary findings in greater detail.
IV. Results - Director Level Analysis
The institutional policy change describe above, combined with the rich director-level database
provides the opportunity to explore changes in industry structure in emerging markets. The
analysis presented in this section investigates whether private yarn firms are more likely than
private non-yarn firms to acquire group directors after their subsidies are removed. This
difference-in-difference strategy identifies the differential effects for yarn firms.
The regression specification is the following:
GroupDirectort = aj + at + AI.(YarnRatio* Post) t + e t (1)
Where GroupDirector.t is a dummy = 1 if director i in firm j in period t is a group director,
and = 0 for private directors. Yarn Ratio is a continuous variable = 1 for yarn-only firms, = 0 for
non-yarn firms, and ranges between 0 and 1 for diversified firms depending on the ratio of their
yarn to total exports in the pre-period.3 fl is the coefficient of interest and represents the
probability that a yarn firm accepts a group director as compared to a non-yarn firm after the
subsidy shock. a and 65, represent firm and period dummies, respectively, and eC is the error
term. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
The regression results are presented in Table 2. While the regression coefficient in column
(1) is positive, it is not statistically significant. However, if the sample is restricted to directors
that belong to the textile industry, I find that yarn firms are 14% more likely than non-yarn firms
to accept group directors on their boards. This result is significant at the 1% level. These results
suggest that a reduction in access to finance does result in a change in industrial composition,
and also importantly, that this change is systematic and identifiable. Private firms that experience
a reduction in their financial access are much more likely to join corporate groups within their
own industry.
3 See Zia (2006) for further details on how Yarn Ratio is constructed.
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This result is consistent with the view that private firms are likely reluctant to join groups
outside their industry as the chance of being expropriated as minority shareholders is much
greater in a diversified group where the group ownership is concentrated in other industries. At
the same time, these firms are willing to be part of groups within their industry as their individual
objectives are likely better aligned with those of the group ownership.
V. Results - Variation Across Different Types of Directors
Table 3 investigates whether there is variation in the group director effect based on director
attributes. Specifically, I examine whether affiliations with publicly listed firms and multi-
director firms changes the results presented in the previous section. This table, therefore, tests
whether group expansion involves the publicly listed sector or whether such changes are only
concentrated among privately held groups. The results show that the group-director movement is
driven almost entirely by the private groups. That is, yarn firms are significantly more likely than
non-yarn firms to accept group directors that belong to privately held firms, and are not more
likely to accept group directors that belong to publicly listed firms. The interaction effect,
presented in column 2, is significant at the 5% level.
Table 4 investigates whether there is cross-integration amongst private firms that are not
absorbed by corporate groups. Restricting the sample to those firms that never receive a group
director, the results show that the number of director cross-holdings does increase by 3% more
for yam firms as compared to non-yarn firms. This result is significant at the 5% level. Hence,
even among the private, stand-alone firms, there is some evidence of horizontal integration.
These results suggest that while a reduction in financial access does lead to a change in
industrial composition, private firms that are affected by the financial shock are selective in the
type of groups they become a part of. That is, private firms are more likely to join groups within
their own industries, and also groups that constitute only privately held firms. Further, the results
suggest that the lack of financial access encourages even the private stand-alone firms to merge
amongst themselves in order to form larger entities, which likely improves their chances of
obtaining bank loans and other forms of financing.
96
VI. Results - Transfer of Ownership Rights
So far, the analysis has shown that yarn firms are significantly more likely to accept group
directors onto their boards as compared to non-yarn firms. This section explores whether group
directors that acquire board positions in private firms also buy ownership stakes in these firms.
Figure 1 plots the time-series of the average percentage shareholding per director for both
private and group directors. While the shareholding per private director declines slightly in each
period following the EFS policy change, the shareholding per group director increases in each
period. Figure 2 presents the same graph with ownership aggregated at the firm level. Private-
director ownership of firms declines sharply after the policy change, while it increases in every
period for group directors. These results suggest that group directors that become part of private
firms do buy ownership stakes in these firms, and that at the same time, the ownership shares of
existing private directors decline.
Table 5 presents regression analysis results for private directors and tests whether their total
ownership at the firm-level declines. The results show that the shareholding of private directors
in yarn firms does decline by 11% relative to non-yarn firms, which again suggests a partial
substitution of ownership rights between private and group directors.
Hence, private firms for whom group directors assume positions on their board also
experience a significant change in their ownership structure. These results strongly suggest that
the movement of group directors into private firms after an adverse financial shock is indicative
of an expansion of the corporate group, since ownership rights are also transferred along with a
seat on the board.
VII. Do Group Directors Respond to Positive Shocks to Private Firms?
The results presented thus far show that private firms that are hit by an adverse financial shock
accept group directors onto their boards. It is natural to ask whether the same pattern is observed
in private firms that receive a positive financial shock. The institutional setting and EFS policy
change is such that it is possible to ask precisely the above-mentioned question. The results in
Zia (2006) shovw that while EFS funding was removed for yarn firms in the textile industry, it
was simultaneously and significantly increased for firms in a handful of other industries, namely
the computer/IT, electronics, and surgical equipment industries. Since I have detailed
directorship data for the entire universe of firms in Pakistan, I can test whether firms in these
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industries are more likely to accept group directors as compared to firms in industries in which
EFS funding remains relatively unchanged.
The regression specification used for this test is the following:
GroupDirector.t = aj + 5t + AP.(Non Textiles = 1 * Post) t + git (2)
Where the regression sample is limited to firms in the computer, electronics, and surgical
equipment industries, as well as firms in the textile industry that were entirely non-yarn
exporters. Hence, (NonTextiles=l) is a dummy =1 for firms in the non-textile industries, and = 0
for the non-yarn firms in the textile industry. All other variables in this regression are the same as
in specification (1).
The results of this regression analysis are presented in Table 6. The coefficients are not
significant in any of the columns, which suggest that firms hit by a positive financial shock are
not more likely to accept group directors on their boards.
VIII. Conclusion
This paper uses a unique director-level panel dataset from Pakistan to investigate whether firms
that are hit by an adverse financial shock are more likely to accept group directors onto their
boards, as compared to firms for whom financial access remains unchanged. The results show
that adversely affected firms are significantly more likely to accept group directors from within
their industry and from privately held groups. In addition, group directors acquire substantial
equity in the private firms they join. Interestingly, these results do not hold for firms that are
simultaneously hit by a positive financial shock.
The results presented in Zia (2006) already show that private firms for whom subsidies are
removed are significantly credit constrained. Hence, it is likely the case that private firms are
forced to accept group directors when they are hit by a negative shock as they have no other
financing options available. The results presented in this paper show that private firms are
selective in the type of groups they become part of, and are more likely to join groups within
their industry and groups that are privately held. Overall, these findings suggest that the
expansion of corporate groups is directly influenced by the ability of firms to obtain financial
access.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
PANEL A: SAMPLE ATTRIBUTES
Total Number of Firms Total Number of Directors
Get a Group Do Not Get a In Group In Non-Group
Director Group Director Director Firms Director Firms
394 non-grp dirs;
120 634 303 grp dirs 1957
PANEL B: PRIVATE FIRMS THAT GET A GROUP DIRECTOR IN THE POST-PERIOD
Pre-Period Post-Period
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
DIRECTOR LEVEL:
Private Director % Shareholding (Per Director) 14.72 21.09 14.11 26.75
Group Director % Shareholding (Per Director) -- -- 23.99 31.56
FIRM LEVEL:
Private Director % Shareholding (Per Firm) 54.93 37.08 41.12 40.94
Group Director % Shareholding (Per Firm) -- -- 40.63 43.24
Number of Directors (Per Firm) 5.09 4.14 5.43 4.78
PANEL C: PRIVATE FIRMS THAT DO NOT GET A GROUP DIRECTOR IN THE POST-PERIOD
Pre-Period Post-Period
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
DIRECTOR LEVEL:
Private Director % Shareholding (Per Director) 35.66 33.92 35.41 38.31
FIRM LEVEL:
Private Director % Shareholding (Per Firm) 59.95 41.32 62.75 48.38
Number of Directors (Per Firm) 2.61 2.14 2.71 2.22
The summary statistics are for private stand-alone firms in the textile industry that were part of the Export Finance Scheme
The sample in Panel B is restricted to firms that receive a group director in the post-period
The sample in Panel C is restricted to firms that do not receive a group director in the post-period
The pre-period consists of 4 6-monthly periods from Dec 1999 - June 2001
The post-period consists of 4 6-monthly periods from Dec 2001 - June 2003
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Table 4: Horizontal Integration Amongst Privately Held Firms?
(1)
Number of Director
Cross-Holdings
Yarn Ratio * Post 0.029**
(0.012)
Firm FEs YES
Year FEs YES
Observations 10066
R-squared 0.422
The regression is run at the director-firm-period level where period refers to 6-month intervals
The sample is restricted to firms that only have private directors on their BODs throughout the sample period
The pre-period consists of 4 6-monthly periods from Dec 1999 - June 2001
The post-period consists of 4 6-monthly periods from Dec 2001 - June 2003
Number of Director Cross-Holdings refers to the number of firms in which the same director holds directorship positions
Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the firm level
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 5: Do Group Directors Acquire Ownership Stakes in Private Firms?
(1)
Onwership % of
Private Directors
Yarn Ratio * Post -10.834***
(3.157)
Firm FEs YES
Year FEs YES
Observations 4316
R-squared 0.7034
The regression is run at the firm-period level where period refers to 6-month intervals
The pre-period consists of 4 6-monthly periods from Dec 1999 - June 2001
The post-period consists of 4 6-monthly periods from Dec 2001 - June 2003
A private director refers to a director that does not have any group affiliation in the pre-period
The dependent variable is: Sum(ownership shares of private directors) / Sum(ownership shares of all directors),
evaluated for each firm in each time period
Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the firm level
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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